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Thiemo Fetzer
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Abstract
This paper documents a significant association between the exposure of an
individual or area to the UK government’s austerity-induced welfare reforms
begun in 2010, and the following: the subsequent rise in support for the UK
Independence Party, an important correlate of Leave support in the 2016 UK
referendum on European Union membership; broader individual-level mea-
sures of political dissatisfaction; and direct measures of support for Leave.
Leveraging data from all UK electoral contests since 2000, along with detailed,
individual-level panel data, the findings suggest that the EU referendum could
have resulted in a Remain victory had it not been for austerity.
Keywords: Political Economy, Austerity, Globalization, Voting, EU
JEL Classification: H2,H3,H5, P16, D72
1 Introduction
Much of the recent rise of populism in the West has been attributed to a politi-
cal backlash against globalization. A host of papers suggest that the distributional
effects of globalization may causally explain the electoral success of populists (Au-
tor et al., 2016; Colantone and Stanig, 2018; Dippel et al., 2015). Other factors,
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such as immigration and, in particular, the free movement of labor within the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), may have similar distributional effects (Ottaviano and Peri,
2012; Dustmann et al., 2013), such factors feature prominently in populist rhetoric
as well. Globalization, by creating winners and losers, puts specific emphasis on
the role of the welfare state (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941; Rodrik, 2000; Stiglitz,
2002). While a functioning welfare state can compensate the globalization’s losers
(Antras et al., 2016), welfare cuts may do the opposite. This paper provides evi-
dence that, at least in the context of the UK, the austerity-induced withdrawal of
the welfare state since 2010 is an important driver to understand both how pres-
sures to hold an EU referendum built up, and why the Leave side won.
I proceed in two steps. Using novel data on the universe of all elections held
in the UK between 2000 and 2015, I present a set of observations that highlight
how the political landscape changed in the UK in the period from 2010 to 2015
immediately prior to the referendum. I focus on the electoral performance of the
UK Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP, established in the late 1990s, was prior to
2016, the only main party in the UK with the explicit goal of leaving the EU. Due
to the tight correlation between UKIP vote shares and an area’s support for Leave
(see Becker et al., 2017 and Figure A1), UKIP’s evolution is an important window
into understanding the buildup of Leave sentiment. Exploiting high-frequency
annual election data, I show that the EU referendum was precipitated by a signif-
icant expansion in electoral support for UKIP in places with weak socioeconomic
fundamentals. For instance, regions with a larger baseline share of residents in
“routine jobs” with a larger share of “low-educated” residents, and with higher
baseline employment shares in retail and manufacturing all experience an increase
in support for UKIP, yet only after 2010.
Why did UKIP gain electoral support in these areas after 2010? Working with
district-level data, I present evidence suggesting that austerity-induced welfare
reforms initiated in late 2010 contributed to the upheavals in the UK’s political
landscape. The fiscal contraction brought about by the Conservative-led govern-
ment starting in 2010 was sizable: aggregate real government spending on welfare
and social protection decreased by around 16 percent per capita. At the district
level - the level at which most administration of welfare spending takes place -
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welfare spending per person fell by 23.4 percent in real terms between 2010 and
2015. Across districts, the extent of the cuts was widely variable, ranging from 46.3
percent to 6.2 percent, with the sharpest reductions in the poorest areas (Innes and
Tetlow, 2015). Using data from government estimates on the expected intensity
of specific welfare cuts across districts, I show that support for UKIP started to
grow in areas with significant exposure to specific benefit cuts after these became
effective. As a further plausibility check, I use the austerity shock to estimate mul-
tiplier effects on local GDP; this yields estimates that compare well with those in
the literature (Ilzetzki et al., 2013).
The austerity-induced increase in support for UKIP is not negligible and sug-
gests that the tight 2016 EU referendum could have well resulted in a victory for
Remain had it not been for austerity. (Leave won by a margin of 3.8 percentage
points) The point estimates suggest that UKIP vote shares increased by between 3.5
to 11.9 percentage points due to austerity. Given the tight link between UKIP vote
shares and an area’s support for Leave, simple back-of-the-envelope calculations
suggest that Leave support in 2016 could have been easily at least 6 percentage
points lower. Because, as this paper shows, support for UKIP is likely to under-
state the overall impact austerity had on Leave sentiment, the results suggest that
without austerity, Remain would likely have won the EU referendum.
In the second step, I turn to individual-level data constructing a rich panel
using the 40,000 household strong Understanding Society study (USOC), which,
in the most recent wave asked the EU referendum question. These data allowme to
address many plausible concerns by exploiting within-individual variation in both
political preferences as well as exposure to specific benefit cuts. The results suggest
that individuals exposed to various welfare reforms experienced distinct, sizable
and precisely estimated increases in their tendency to express support for UKIP
and, in turn, to support Leave in 2016. Further, they increasingly perceive that
their vote does not make a difference, that they do “not have a say in government
policy” or that “public officials do not care.” Each of these measures is a strong
correlate of support of support for Leave over and above what can be accounted
for when controlling for respondents’ political party preferences. The timing of
the effects is consistent with individual reforms becoming effective for the affected
3
populations (for example, households living in social housing judged to have a
“spare bedroom”). Further, for a set of benefit reforms I can document auxiliary
effects directly along relevant margins (for example, households living in social
rented housing with a “spare bedroom” avoiding benefit cuts by moving to smaller
accommodation). While UKIP gains among those exposed to cuts, support for the
Conservative Party that brought about the cuts goes down. This suggests that
there are political costs to austerity - a notion for which there is limited evidence
in the literature (Arias and Stasavage, 2016; Alesina et al., 2011, 1998).
Lastly, while an in-depth exploration of the underlying economic reasons of
why individuals become reliant on the welfare state (and thus, exposed to aus-
terity) goes beyond this paper, I provide some suggestive evidence indicating that
shocks and economic trends that contribute to the skill divide in labor markets are
likely particularly relevant. I show that, consistent with the literature document-
ing growing polarization in labor markets (Card and DiNardo, 2002; Lemieux,
2006; Goos et al., 2014), in the past 15 years UK labor incomes diverged along the
human-capital divide. Against this backdrop, the UK welfare state was responsive,
providing growing transfers to those who, in relative terms, were increasingly left
behind. This came to an abrupt halt from 2010, as the welfare reforms started
to bite, marking the onset of the populist backlash. While a host of economic
mechanisms which may contribute to the growing skill bias in the economy1, the
patterns are very consistent with this paper’s central argument, which suggests
that austerity was key to activating these existing grievances, and to producing the
sentiment that ultimately culminated in the Brexit vote.
This paper is related to several strands in the literature. The paper highlights
that, at least in the UK context, economic drivers are a non-negligible factor to
understand the rise of populism. This lies in contrast with research that traces
the origins of the populist wave to a latent cultural drift within Western societies
with work such as Fukuyama (2018), Mutz (2018) and Norris and Inglehart (2019)
mostly suggesting that economic factors are less relevant. In research similar to
1For example trade integration and offshoring (Autor et al., 2013; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004),
structural transformation (Rogerson, 2008; Rodrik, 2016), the rise of automation (Caprettini and
Voth, 2015; Graetz and Michaels, 2015), technological change more broadly (Acemoglu, 1998; Autor
et al., 2003) or possibly due to migration (Becker and Fetzer, 2018; Dustmann et al., 2013).
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that of this paper, Bo´ et al. (2018) carefully trace the economic origins of the re-
cent rise in the populist Swedish Democrats to policy-induced economic losses
exacerbating grievances between labor market “outsiders” and “insiders.” They
suggest that economic pressures may make people more receptive toward mes-
sages emphasizing the fiscal costs of immigration; the effect may be an indirect
one, as they suggest that the growth in anti-immigration attitudes appears second
order compared to the overall growth of distrust among the economic distressed.
Guiso et al. (2018) study the supply- and demand-side of populism. After ac-
counting for turnout, they suggest that economic insecurity is an important driver
of demand for populist policies. Also in Sweden, Dehdari (2017) links economic
distress to support for right-wing parties, while Algan et al. (2017) document that
in areas and among individuals more exposed to economic shocks in the wake of
the financial crisis, support for populist parties and distrust in political institutions
grew. Trade integration with low-income countries may similarly have contributed
to the buildup of economic grievances; these grievances have been suggested as an
important causal factor behind the surge in populism (Autor et al., 2016; Colantone
and Stanig, 2018; Che et al., 2017; Dippel et al., 2015).2 While labor market dynam-
ics are important in contributing to the growing reliance on the welfare state, the
results presented here are not confounded by labor market shocks; rather, they
capture genuine effects due to changes in the UK’s welfare system.
Another related literature links the recent rise in populism to various forms
of immigration, which typically features strongly in populist rhetoric. While the
effects may depend on the underlying type of immigration (e.g. legal or illegal
immigration, refugee movements), the literature broadly documents, with a few
exceptions, that support for right-wing platforms increases in areas affected by mi-
gration (see Mayda et al., 2018 for the US, Dustmann et al., 2018 in Denmark and
Halla et al., 2017 in Austria).3 While anti-immigration rhetoric featured strongly
2This builds on a rich literature studying the distributional effects of globalzation (Revenga,
1992; Autor et al., 2013; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001b).
3Scheve and Slaughter (2001a); Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) study preferences over im-
migration policy in the United States. A rich literature studies the economic effects of migration:
Ottaviano and Peri (2012); Dustmann et al. (2013) find immigration to have small negative effects
for US and UK native residents with low human capital.
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in the 2016 EU referendum campaign, the results presented here suggest that sup-
port for UKIP can be associated to an individuals’ exposure to welfare reforms
producing distinct grievances. By documenting that populist voting in the UK can
be linked to exposure to austerity through welfare reforms, this paper relates to
a growing literature studying the interactions between political preferences and
austerity, or fiscal policy more broadly (Alesina et al., 2011, 1998). A paper closely
related to this one is Galofre´-Vila` et al. (2017), who link the rise of the Nazi Party
in the 1930s to an area’s exposure to austerity. Also related is the work of Ponticelli
and Voth (2017), who find a positive correlation between austerity and popular un-
rest more broadly. Arias and Stasavage (2016) find no evidence of a political cost
to austerity; their findings are similar to those of Alesina et al. (2011). This paper
is able to tackle many plausible identification concerns that arise when working
with low-frequency election results data, by turning to rich high-frequency indi-
vidual level panel data. The paper presents evidence on a range of further margins,
which indicate that exposure to welfare reforms produced tangible grievances that
contributed to a consequential political effect: Brexit.
Lastly, the paper naturally relates to a growing literature on Brexit. Most of this
work is purely cross sectional. By contrast, this paper comprehensively adds a time
dimension.4 Colantone and Stanig (2018), following the seminal paper by Autor
et al. (2013), find compelling evidence suggesting that Leave support was distinctly
higher in areas of the UK most exposed to import competition from low-income
countries. This paper qualifies these findings, suggesting that post-2010 austerity,
by cutting transfer payments to globalization’s likely losers, is an important factor
that can explain the timing of the UK’s populist revolt. Further, the paper suggests
that the economic origins of exposure to the welfare state (and, hence, to austerity)
likely go beyond what can be explained by trade integration alone. Turning to
the consequences of Brexit, Born et al. (2018), using a synthetic control approach,
estimate a cumulative Brexit-induced output loss of £19.3 billion, accrued between
the EU referendum and the end of the 2017 calendar year. Given that the fiscal
4A rich descriptive correlational and purely cross-sectional literature emerged since the Leave
vote (see Hobolt, 2016; Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Becker et al., 2017), while (populist) campaigning
and social media around the EU referendum are studied in a few papers (Gorodnichenko et al.,
2016; Goodwin et al., 2018).
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savings of the austerity measures studied in this paper were projected to be around
£18.9 billion per year, this suggests that the economic costs of Brexit are likely
already higher than the austerity-induced fiscal savings that this paper argues
significantly contributed to Brexit. More broadly, Dhingra et al. (2017) discuss the
cost (and benefits) of the UK leaving the EU, while Breinlich et al. (2017) document
the welfare losses due to inflation following the Brexit-induced drop in the value
of the pound.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2, discusses the context and
the main data. Section 3 provides motivating evidence. Section 4 studies the
impact of austerity at the district level, while Section 5 turns to individual level
data. Section 6 concludes.
2 Context and data
2.1 UK Politics, the EU, and the EU referendum
The UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor of the
EU in 1973, and held its first ”in or out” referendum just two-and-a-half years later
following the Labour Party’s 1974 pledge to renegotiate the terms of British mem-
bership of the EEC, and to consult the public in a referendum on whether Britain
should stay in the EEC on the new terms. The referendum on 5 June 1975 asked
the electorate: “Do you think that the UK should stay in the European Commu-
nity (the Common Market)?”. The referendum resulted in a decisive victory for
remain with a victory margin of 34.5 percent. Since the 1975 Referendum, the EEC
has evolved into the central pillar of what became the European Union with the
Maastricht Treaty of 1993. Further steps to European integration were formalized
through the treaties of Amsterdam in 1997, Nice in 2001, and Lisbon in 2009.
In parallel to the growing institutionalization of the EU, opposition to fur-
ther integration grew in the UK. The UK opted out of the single currency and
the border-free Schengen travel area. After the Maastricht Treaty, the UK In-
dependence Party (UKIP) formed out of the Anti-Federalist League, adopting a
wider right-wing platform, making it the only significant party in the UK’s po-
litical system that, prior to 2016, had the explicit goal of leaving the EU (Lynch
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and Whitaker, 2013). UKIP gained traction over time, attracting defectors mainly
from the Conservative Party, and developing a footprint in local, European and
Westminster elections. Earlier cross-sectional work suggests that UKIP drew its
supporters from two pools of voters: 1) more affluent middle-class “strategic de-
fectors” from the Conservatives who identify with UKIP’s Euroskeptic platform,
and, later, 2) economically struggling, working-class voters with traditional Labour
Party backgrounds (see Ford et al., 2012). Because electoral support for UKIP is
tightly related with Leave support in 2016, it provides a good proxy variable to
pick up broader “Leave sentiment,” which, as I will show, encapsulates broader
measures of disaffection as well.
UKIP was seen as a threat to the Conservatives leading the party to adopt anti-
EU stances: In March 2009, the Conservatives left the centre-right block in the
European Parliament to join a group of right-wing parties, while the 2010 Con-
servative manifesto set out “to bring back key powers over legal rights, criminal
justice and social and employment legislation to the UK.” In the run-up to the
2015 general election, UK Prime Minister David Cameron pledged to hold an EU
referendum by the end of 2017 if the Conservative Party were to win the election.
Reports suggest that Cameron never expected to find himself in circumstances
necessitating action on his pledge as he, and most polls, predicted another hung
parliament and a continuation of the coalition with the pro-EU Liberal Democrats.5
Yet, electoral gains for UKIP in England and the SNP in Scotland split the oppo-
sition votes, resulting in a surprise outright election win for the Conservatives.
After a round of negotiations with the EU, the EU referendum was called, with
Cameron campaigning for Remain in 2016.
The official Leave campaign and UKIP’s own Leave campaign used an aggres-
sive populist campaign that likely would have resonated well in areas most af-
fected by austerity. Throughout, the Leave campaign wrongly claimed that the
“UK sends £350 million to the EU every single week”.6 The correct figure is £181
5The Guardian, Cameron did not think EU referendum would happen, https://goo.gl/
Vsmgnt, accessed 03.03.2019.
6The following inline quotes are from advertisements run by the Vote Leave campaign. These
have been made available following a UK Parliamentary investigation in late July 2018 and can be
accessed online https://goo.gl/UtX2QG.
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million, amounting to 1.2 percent of overall UK government spending.7 The cam-
paign suggested that the UK’s contribution to the EU budget could be used to
support the National Health Service (NHS), which faced pressures that the cam-
paign in turn blamed on immigration. The campaign highlighted that “layoffs and
hospital closures continue throughout the UK” because “money is running out,”
stoking fears about whether “your local NHS [could] survive.” The campaign sug-
gested that leaving the EU was without risks as the UK would hold all the cards
in any subsequent negotiations with the EU. It suggested that the UK could re-
tain the benefits of EU membership without meeting any of its obligations, and
it implied that a windfall profit would result from leaving the EU “to spend on
OUR PRIORITIES and NOT THEIRS.” Similarly, the campaign suggested that im-
migration is to blame for cuts in the UK health care system as “local hospitals are
shutting down across the UK because of pressures from EU immigration policies”.
The campaign further claimed that “the EU acts overwhelmingly in the interests
of big business and against the interests of workers,” and suggested that remain-
ing in the EU would erode workers’ rights. Lastly, the campaign suggested that
UK public money was wasted by supporting luxurious lifestyles of “corrupt” EU
bureaucrats; it contended that “EU officials wasted thousands of pounds on elite
chauffeur services and prestige cars.” It is not inconceivable that this type of cam-
paigning was particularly effective in areas and among people most affected by
austerity.8 After a 10 week campaign period, Leave narrowly won the referendum
with 51.9% of the votes on 23. June 2016.
2.2 Measuring Leave sentiment
Throughout this paper, the electoral performance or expressions of support for
UKIP is a key outcome variable. I next describe both the data on the electoral
7Office of National Statistics, The UK contribution to the EU budget, https://goo.gl/nsVuaD,
accessed 03.03.2019.
8UKIP’s 2015 manifesto was not campaigning on a very distinct anti-austerity platform com-
pared to, for example, Labour. Their manifesto was similar to Labour’s by promising to revoke
the “bedroom tax” for example; it mainly stood out suggesting that the UK leaving the EU would
produce a fiscal windfall to be spend on preserving the NHS. Similar funding pledges for the NHS,
albeit not linked to EU membership fees, were included in Labour’s manifesto.
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performance of UKIP across elections, and the individual-level panel data.9
Election data I leverage data from the population of electoral contests between
2000 to 2015, drawing on data from Westminster, European, and local council
elections in this time frame, as well as from the 2016 EU referendum. The per-
formances of UKIP across the different types of electoral contests over time are
presented in the left panel of Figure 1. Support for UKIP surged significantly
after 2010 across all election types, yet, the overall levels of support for UKIP
are different, which is due to the different electoral systems and due to the way
election results are reported. Westminster elections are conducted using a first-
past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system, which results in voters casting their votes
strategically, favoring large parties. As a result, UKIP, like most other small par-
ties, has performed quite poorly, with its vote share being well below 10 percent
prior to 2010. Yet, in 2015 UKIP came in third, winning 12.6 percent of the popu-
lar vote, while still only winning a single seat (which was held by a Conservative
Party member who had defected to UKIP), highlighting the distortions introduced
by FPTP.10 Constructing consistent measures of an area’s population’s political
preferences across Westminster elections is difficult due to regular constituency
boundary changes. Bearing in mind these caveats, I harmonize the results across
elections to the 2001 constituency boundaries using detailed ward-level shapefiles
together with 2001 population figures. The resulting data set is a balanced panel
of 570 harmonized constituencies in which I measure UKIP’s vote share; I assign
an area with a zero if UKIP did not field a candidate there.
I also leverage data from the European Parliamentary (EP) Elections held in
2004, 2009, and 2014. These elections report results at the local authority district
level. Importantly, they essentially use proportional representation to allocate the
British seats in the European Parliament. Not surprisingly, as strategic voting con-
cerns do not weigh in, UKIP has significantly higher vote shares, increasing from
15.6 percent in 2004 to 26.6 percent in 2014. The extent and the spatial distribution
9Summary statistics of the main variables are provided in Appendix Table A1.
10A further distortion may be introduced since not all parties field candidates in each con-
stituency. After 2001, this is not a major concern for the analysis as UKIP fielded 496 candidates in
2005, 558 candidates in 2010, and 624 in 2015 across roughly 650 potential seats.
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of UKIP support base across EP elections changed significantly between 2004 and
2014, as Figure 2 illustrates. UKIP gains since 2004 are most concentrated in the
coastal regions, Wales, and parts of the industrial areas of the Midlands. Panel C
presents the spatial distribution of the 2016 EU Leave vote share, for which the
official counting areas were also the 380 local authority districts; the map high-
lights the tight relationship between an areas’ support for UKIP and support for
the Leave already alluded to earlier. While EP elections use proportional represen-
tation, and are thus able to pick up protest voting quite well, EP elections usually
have low turnout. Further, EP andWestminster elections happen only infrequently,
which may limit the statistical power of analysis exploiting time-varying shocks.
To navigate the issue of the low-frequency nature of EP and Westminster elec-
tions, I also make use of local council election data for England and Wales since
2000. Local elections have an appealing feature in that, rather than happening uni-
formly across the UK every four years such elections may take place in any given
year across the UK due to the rotating fashion by which councillors are elected.11
The left panel of Figure 1 highlights that across local elections, UKIP’s vote share
hovered between Westminster election performance (as lower bound) and Euro-
pean election performance (as upper bound), ranging from between 5 percent and
12 percent in the 2004-2009 period, and peaking at 22.7 percent in 2013. Yet, the
figures are likely downward biased because most local elections are conducted at
the local ward level, while election results are collated at the level of the local au-
thority district.12 This implies that if UKIP does not field candidates in each of the
races at the ward level, UKIP’s vote shares are mechanically downward biased as
wards that were not contested mechanically contribute zero votes.13
While each of the different types of election results data has its own advantages
and disadvantages, the results focusing on election outcomes are robust across
election types. I next detail the individual-level panel data, which allow for sharper
empirical designs and finer outcome measurement.
11Terms last for four years, and most councils hold elections by “thirds” with a third of the seats
up for election each year, and with no election held one year. See appendix B.1 for more details.
12The ward-level boundaries are changing over time; as of 2014, there were 9,456 electoral wards.
13Results are robust to restricting to districts in which UKIP almost continuously contested.
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Individual-level panel data This paper leverages a newly constructed individual-
level panel data set, making use of the USOC panel study with approximately
40,000 households contributing across the UK. Participating households are vis-
ited, on average, every year. Interviews are carried out face to face in respondents’
homes by trained interviewers or through a self-completed online survey. Respon-
dents are coded based on the residence at the district-level and in this paper, I
use data from the first eight waves covering the years from 2009 to 2016. Given
the gradual data collection, I can construct a quarterly individual-level unbalanced
panel.
The survey instruments used across waves are quite harmonized. In particular,
each survey wave includes an instrument eliciting respondents’ and households’
sources of income and employment status. Further, most survey waves include a
module to elicit political preferences. Respondents are first asked “whether they
see themselves a supporter of a specific political party” or “whether they are closer
to a political party compared to another.” If neither of these questions is success-
ful in eliciting a response of a party name, the remainder of the respondents are
asked which party they would vote for if a general election were held tomorrow.
The resulting answers are coded as dummy variable if respondent expresses sup-
port for UKIP (or any of the other parties).14 Panel B of Figure 1 presents the share
of respondents expressing support for UKIP over time. The plot highlights that
support for UKIP surged from around 2013 onward, and remained distinctly high
among individuals directly exposed to any of the three welfare reforms studied
in detail in Section 5. In addition to asking questions about political party pref-
erences, survey waves two, three and six included further measures of of broader
dissatisfaction or discontent, asking questions of individual’s perceived political
influence (whether individuals think their vote makes a difference), the extent to
which they think that “public officials do not care” or that they have “no say
in what government does.” I use these measures as further outcome variables
capturing broader discontent and anti-establishment sentiment. These sentiments
14Hence, for a significant share of respondents, preferences are elicited without election framing;
I further can directly tackle issues concerning prospective turnout as respondents can state that they
would not vote or support any party (Bursztyn et al., 2017; Guiso et al., 2018). More details on the
data are provided in Appendix B.2.
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are strongly associated with Leave preferences and also strongly increase among
those exposed to welfare reforms. Further, as I later discuss in detail, the data al-
low me to study other adjustment margins directly relevant to some of the reforms
studied. Lastly, the most recent USOC wave 8 actually asks the EU referendum
question, providing an additional, immediately relevant outcome measure, which
I will link with the empirical analysis of support for UKIP and the measures of
broader discontent.
I next present a range of stylized facts used to motivate the subsequent analysis.
3 Where (and when) did UKIP start to grow?
I first present a range of stylized facts, which highlight that UKIP-support dis-
tinctly grew in areas with weak socioeconomic fundamentals, but only after 2010.
3.1 Empirical specification
Using data from the local, Westminster and EP elections, I estimate the follow-
ing regression:
yi,r,t = ai + br,t + Â
t 6=2010
ht ⇥Yeart ⇥ Xi,baseline + ei,r,t (1)
where yirt denotes UKIP vote shares in council, Westminster and EP elections.
The fixed effect ai absorbs any time-invariant differences in political preferences
or sentiment across districts.15 Region-by-time fixed effects brt capture non-linear
time trends specific to each of the eleven regions across the UK. The main coeffi-
cients of interest are the interaction terms between (fixed) baseline socio-economic
characteristic Xi,baseline and a set of year fixed effects. I plot out the estimated
coefficients hˆt over time relative to 2010 as the reference year (2009 for the EP elec-
tions) to capture how UKIP differentially gained support over time as a function of
Xi,baseline. Throughout the paper, standard errors are clustered at the district level
(constituency level for the Westminster election analysis).16
15Local Council election results, similar to EP elections, are reported at the district level; the
Westminster election results data is presented at the harmonized 2001 constituency level.
16Districts are the main meaningful subnational administrative unit in the UK. Results are robust
to computing spatial HAC errors or clustering at a higher level statistical areas.
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I focus on four main characteristics Xi,baseline that stand out due to their promi-
nence in the cross-sectional analysis of the Leave vote and their relevance to the
wider literature: the share of the 2001 resident population with no formal qualifica-
tions, the share working in routine jobs, and the working-age resident population
shares working in the manufacturing and retail sectors.17
3.2 Results
I discuss results for the local elections presented in Figure 3 in more detail.18
Human capital Panel A of Figure 3 focuses on a baseline proxy measure of area’s
population’s human capital. The results suggest that support for UKIP gradually
trends up as a function of the share of the resident population with low educational
attainment. The correlation between support for UKIP and the measure of low
human capital only becomes sharply stronger after 2010.
Routine jobs In Panel B of Figure 3, I present results when studying how the
degree of correlation between support for UKIP in local elections and the share of
an area’s working-age population employed in routine jobs as per the Census so-
cioeconomic status classification. Prior to 2010, support for UKIP is not statistically
associated with the share working in routine jobs. Since 2010, this correlation be-
comes sharply stronger, which can account for, on average, 7.5 (or 6.7) percentage
points of the increase increase in UKIP vote shares in local elections since 2010 (in
EP elections between 2009 and 2014).
Economic structure Lastly, panels C and D of Figure 3 zoom in on measures
of a district’s local economic structure, focusing on employment shares in retail and
manufacturing sectors. The latter is of particular interest due to the manufacturing
sector’s exposure to trade integration. The retail sector is represented all across the
country, and the sector is, for the bulk of jobs, not directly subject to global trade
exposure; at the same time, however, it provides relatively low-quality jobs, and
17Appendix C.1 shows that patterns presented here are robust to alternative fixed effects, dif-
ferent sample cuts and broader or more refined baseline measures. Further, in appendix C.2, I
document that the growth of UKIP is mostly at the expense of the Conservative party.
18Appendix Figure C1 and Figure C2 highlight that I obtain very similar results studying UKIP’s
performance in EP and Westminster elections.
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is likely indirectly affected by contractions in consumer spending. Areas with
larger employment shares in retail and manufacturing saw significant increases in
electoral support for UKIP after 2010. As we will see, these sectors are dispropor-
tionately affected by the contraction in local area incomes due to austerity.
Discussion The observation that UKIP, after 2010, starts to thrive distinctly in
areas characterized by low educational attainment, and a significant share of the
population working in routine jobs or in manufacturing or retail suggests that the
underlying causal drivers of the EU referendum may go beyond what is currently
known. The extent of knowledge on this issue has been limited because most
papers thus far have studied the topic using cross-sectional data.19 A central ques-
tion is why the structure of support for UKIP only changed so rapidly after 2010.
The next sections presents evidence on how austerity is the likely causal factor
explaining these trends, starting with aggregate district-level evidence in Section 4
and then moving to evidence from individual-level data in Section 5.
4 Austerity as activating factor?
I next present evidence from aggregate data suggesting that austerity measures
are likely factors behind the shift toward UKIP.
4.1 Aggregate trends in fiscal spending
In the wake of the financial crisis, the Conservative-led coalition government
that came to power after the May 2010 General Election brought forward wide-
ranging austerity measures to reign in public-sector deficits. The government cut
spending across all levels of government. Panel A of Figure 4 suggests that, start-
ing in 2011, spending for welfare and social protection dropped significantly, de-
clining by 16 percent in real terms, falling to levels that had last been seen in the
early 2000s. Spending on healthcare, which was spared direct cuts, flatlined. Yet
the rapidly aging population added pressures on health care services. Further,
spending on education contracted by 19 percent in real terms, while expenses for
19Colantone and Stanig (2018) suggest that import-competition may be an important causal
factor that can explain Leave support. In Appendix Figure C8, I partial out non-linear time trends
in their main measure along with trends in manufacturing employment. Throughout, the patterns
remain intact suggesting that import-competition may only explain a part of the Leave vote.
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pensions steadily increased, suggesting a significant shift in the composition of
government spending. The Conservative-led government used three methods to
cut spending. First, the initial wave taking immediate effect with the announce-
ment of the autumn budget in 2010 cut budgets for day-to-day spending across
most Westminster departments.20 Local government funding fell significantly,
putting pressures on local councils to provide services, despite increasing demand
due to population growth (Innes and Tetlow, 2015). A second significant compo-
nent took the form of nominal freezes. From 2011 to 2013, the government froze
salaries of public-sector employees earning more than £21,000. Beginning in 2014,
it capped public-sector wage growth at 1 percent. Similar freezes were introduced
for most welfare benefits, resulting in cuts in real terms, as inflation averaged be-
tween 2 and 4 percent throughout this period. In this paper, I focus on the third
important component of austerity – the reform of the welfare state – which was
set in motion through the Welfare Reform Act 2012.
4.2 Exposure of welfare cuts at the district level
I draw on data from Beatty and Fothergill (2013), who, using detailed data on
the distribution of claimants across different types of benefits before reforms be-
came effective, provide an estimate of the incidence of the different welfare cuts
at the district level. Beatty and Fothergill (2013) consider 10 different measures,
which, taken together, were expected to yield fiscal savings of up to £18.9 billion
per year by 2015. The estimates of the intensity of exposure of an area to the
welfare reforms are “deeply rooted in official statistics” drawing in “data from the
Treasury’s own estimates of the projected savings, the government’s impact assess-
ments, and benefit claimant data.”21 The exposure of an area to specific reforms is
measured as the financial loss per working age adult in a district and year. The ag-
gregate figure masks a wide range of variation in the intensity of treatment, which
is driven by the heterogeneity in the distribution of benefit claimants across the
UK prior to the reforms. This variation is visually presented in Panel B of Figure
4. The overall projected financial loss per working adult varied between £914 in
20The Department for International Development and the Department for Health, which funds
the National Health Service (NHS), were spared cuts.
21Online Appendix B.3 provides more detailed description of the data.
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Blackpool and £177 in the City of London.
The measures with the largest effect were the reform of tax credits, changes
to child benefit, and the capping of benefit increases to account for inflation to
1% per year. Tax credits are a means-tested transfer to households to top up low
incomes; child benefit is an unconditional benefit paid out to families. The re-
form of tax credits involved a faster withdrawal of the transfer payment as income
grows, in addition to a host of changes to eligibility requirements. This complexity
makes identifying the affected group in the population difficult because exposure
depends on a rage of characteristics. In the case of child benefit, the main measure
was to make the benefit means tested withdrawing child-benefit from better-off
households with at least one earner with an annual pre-tax income above £50,000.
According to the estimates from the Department of Works and Pensions, these
three measures alone were expected to generate around £10 billion in savings per
year by 2015. It is estimated that changes to tax credits and child benefit affected
between 4.135 million to 6.980 million households, or roughly between 15-25 per-
cent of the 27.2 million UK households. My paper demonstrates that these specific
measures, while having small direct effect on individual households, had sizable
indirect effects on the local economy.22 In the individual-level analysis, I focus on
three smaller welfare reforms – the abolishment of council tax benefit, the so-called
“bedroom-tax” and the introduction of Personal Independence Payments replac-
ing Disability Living allowance – about which I provide more detail later in Section
5. I first estimate the impact of the overall welfare-reform austerity measures on
voting outcomes, incomes, and support for Leave.
4.3 Empirical strategy
I perform three related exercises. First, I estimate a difference-in-differences
specification to study how support for UKIP distinctly grew after 2010 in areas
more exposed to cuts across local, European and Westminster elections. I fur-
ther explore an event study design similar to specification 1, where I replace the
measure Xi,baseline with a measure the exposure of district i to welfare reform j,
22In total, the paper studies five measures in some detail. The other reforms are indirectly
accounted for in the overall austerity impact measure. Appendix Section B.3 explains how data
availability guides the focus on these reforms.
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Austerityi,j. Further, I study a specification allowing me to estimate local multipli-
ers. The pooled difference-in-difference specification takes the following form:
yi,r,t = ai + br,t + g⇥ 1(Year > 2010)⇥Austerityi,j + ei,r,t (2)
The only difference compared to the earlier event studies specification 1 is that the
treatment periods are pooled together. As we will see when studying the event
studies as second exercise, this is likely to underestimate the specific impacts of
some benefit cuts that only became effective starting 2013.
For the third exercise, the estimation of local multipliers, I obtained district-
level data from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) on local area gross value
added by sectors.23 I also estimate an event study to highlight that contractions
in district GDP due to austerity only occur after austerity takes effect. Lastly, I
show that exposure to austerity, changes in support for UKIP and higher levels of
support for Leave in 2016 in the cross section are tightly linked.
4.4 Results
I first discuss the pooled difference-in-difference results, before turning to the
event studies and the estimates of the multipliers.
Pooled difference-in-difference The results from estimating specification 2 are
presented in Table 1. The rows explore UKIP’s electoral performance in local,
European and Westminster elections, while the columns explore the different wel-
fare reform j-specific measures Austerityi,j taken from Beatty and Fothergill (2013).
Column 1 studies the impact of the overall estimated impact of the reforms. The
average anticipated financial loss per working-age adult was estimated to be £447.1.
Given that the median household disposable income in the UK stands at just
around £27,300, this is a non-negligible amount. The point estimates indicate a
strong positive relationship between the austerity exposure and UKIP’s electoral
performance. Computing the full in-sample distribution of point estimates implied
by column (1) suggests that UKIP’s electoral performance increased, on average,
by 6.5, 3.5, 3.8 percentage points across local, European or Westminster elections
23The data are available from the ONS at https://goo.gl/eJgiLf, accessed 15.06.2018.
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respectively after 2010.
Columns 2-6 zoom in to a set of specific benefit cuts, in particular, changes
to tax credit (TC) and child benefit (CB). For the former, I find sizable effects on
support for UKIP, while for the latter the results are more mixed. This is due to
the nature of the child benefit cut, which affected relatively well-off households.
Other key welfare reforms (which are described in detail in Section 5.2) - abolish-
ing council tax benefit (CTB) and the disability living allowance (DLA), and the
”bedroom tax” (BTX) - almost exclusively affected low-income households. For
these benefit cuts, I have reasonably sharp timings and eligibility rules that I can
trace out in the individual-level data. Across most of these specific reforms, the
aggregate election data suggest similar sized effects across Panels A - C.
At the bottom of Table 1, I provide some summary statistics on the size and
distribution of the cuts. For example, the bedroom tax explored in column (6)
was expected to yield fiscal savings of just £10.81 per working-age adult; yet, the
measure was much more concentrated, affecting an estimated 660,000 households.
Further, I also provide the correlations between the share of working age house-
holds affected by the reforms and the baseline district measures explored in section
3. This highlights non-negligible cross-correlations between an area’s exposure to
austerity and these measures, indicating that indeed, benefit cuts were particu-
larly concentrated in areas with significant resident shares with low qualifications
or significant working-age adult populations working in routine jobs.
Event studies The pooled difference-in-difference analysis, by averaging the co-
efficient estimates after 2010, may underestimate the effect of austerity. Welfare
cut measures, such as freezing of benefits, or changes in inflation indexing, com-
pound over time, while others only become fully effective at a later date. This only
affects the local election results, because for Westminster and EP elections, only
a single election occurred in the time window between 2010 and 2015 before the
referendum. Nevertheless, looking at Westminster and EP elections is still useful
in terms of whether support for UKIP in more austerity-exposed areas followed
similar trends prior to the time when the reforms took effect.
While the vast majority of benefit cuts were introduced as part of the Wel-
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fare Reform Act 2012 and became effective with the start of the financial year in
2013, some measures, such as reforms to tax credits or nominal freezes had al-
ready taken effect in 2011. In the event studies presented in Figure 5, I focus
on the overall austerity exposure measure in Panel A, as well as three individual
policies further detailed in the next section. Throughout, there is no evidence of
systematic divergence before 2011 in a fashion that is correlated with exposure to
austerity. Markedly, the timing is also quite consistent with the specific measures.
The first effects appear in 2012 for the overall austerity measures in Panel A, which
is significantly carried by the tax credit reforms taking effect from April 2011. The
estimated coefficient for the year 2015 is, not surprisingly, larger compared to
the pooled difference-in-difference estimates: the full distribution of implied ef-
fect sizes across England and Wales suggests that the main austerity measure can
explain an increase in support for UKIP of 11.9 percentage points by 2015.
Panels B - D focus on three reforms further detailed in the next section – the
abolishment of council tax benefit, the so-called “bedroom-tax” and the introduc-
tion of Personal Independence Payments replacing Disability Living allowance.
There is no evidence of diverging pre-trends for any of these reforms. The timing
of each of the effects is quite consistent with the times at which various measures
(particularly for the abolishing of the council tax benefit) took hold.24
Local multipliers I estimate local spending multipliers as a further plausibility
check. The average local authority district was expected to lose £447.1 per working-
age adult in transfer income, which should result in further indirect contractions
of local incomes. I estimate these multiplier effects using data on local-area GDP
estimates. The only difference from the main estimating equation is that the de-
pendent variable now is the log value added per working-age adult by sector,
while the independent variable is the overall austerity-exposure measure.
The results are presented in Appendix Table A3. The estimates suggest a sig-
nificant negative relationship between austerity exposure and local GDP: for every
24Appendix Figure A2 presents the same figures for Westminster elections. Appendix Figure
A3 looks at EP elections. In Westminster elections there are no evident pre-trends, while for EP,
there are a noteworthy trend-changes after 2009. Further, results are robust to linear time trends as
evidenced in Appendix Table A2.
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pound contraction in transfer income to working-age adults, local-area gross value
added contracts by around 2.4 pounds. The multiplier effects are broadly carried
by contractions in the distribution and retail sectors, as well as by the manufac-
turing sector. The magnitude of the multipliers and the distribution across sectors
are quite consistent with estimates in the wider literature (Ilzetzki et al., 2013).25
Austerity, UKIP, and Leave support in 2016 The previous results suggest that
austerity, at the aggregate level, is consistently and significantly associated with
the steep rise in support for UKIP after individual austerity measures started to
take effect. In turn, changes in support for UKIP across elections and the Leave
vote are also tightly linked. In column (1) of Appendix Table A4, I highlight that
areas exposed to austerity experience higher levels of support for Leave in 2016.
Similarly, column (2) suggests that areas that see marked swings to UKIP across
the three election types studied see higher levels of support for Leave in 2016.
Across election types, the estimated coefficients suggest that a 1 percentage point
larger swing to UKIP is associated with a 0.9 to 1.9 percentage point higher level
of support for Leave in 2016. Column (3) further highlights that changes in sup-
port for UKIP are tightly correlated with the district-level austerity exposure: after
controlling for the swing to UKIP, the coefficient on the austerity measure shrinks
markedly. This suggests that a lot of the variation that drives the correlation be-
tween the austerity measure and the Leave vote share can, in fact, be captured by
the change in support for UKIP.
I next turn to use these observations to provide back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lations. The estimated effects of austerity and UKIP are sizable and substantially
meaningful: a victory for Remain in the 2016 EU referendum would have been much
more likely, had it not been for austerity. Taking the point estimates from column
(2) of Appendix Table A4, which links changes in support for UKIP with leave
support in 2016, I can obtain estimates of the potential impact that austerity had
on support for leave. For European election, the previous analysis suggests that
the austerity-induced increase in support for UKIP of around 3.5 percentage points
may have translated into up to 3.5⇥ 1.9 = 6.7 percentage points higher levels of
25Appendix Figure A4 shows that there are no pre-trends in local area gross value added across
districts and that the contraction is tightly related with the onset of austerity after 2010.
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support for Leave. For local elections, the full distribution of pooled difference-in-
difference estimates suggested that the austerity exposure can account for, on aver-
age, a 6.5 percentage point increase in support for UKIP. Taking the corresponding
point estimate from Appendix Table A4 suggests that leave support could have
been at least 6.5⇥ 0.9 = 5.9 percentage points lower. In the event studies for local
elections, the analysis suggested that the increase in support for UKIP by 2015 that
can be attributed to the main austerity measure is 11.9 percentage points. This
would suggest that leave support in 2016 could have been up to 11.9⇥ 0.9 = 10.7
percentage points lower. This implies that even conservative estimates would sug-
gest that Remain would have won the EU referendum had it not been for austerity.
Despite the consistency of results in terms of timing, magnitude, and election
types, a range of concerns still make it difficult to interpret the results in a causal
fashion. In particular, selection into benefit receipt could be endogenous to an
area’s exposure to austerity. In addition, austerity may affect political preferences,
and contribute to the buildup of Leave sentiment more broadly in ways that do
not necessarily operate solely through changes in support for UKIP. Lastly, the ob-
served changes in the election results could also reflect changes in composition of
turnout (Guiso et al., 2018). To tackle these concerns, I next turn to an individual-
level panel, which will allow me to get cleaner identification by tracking pools of
individuals affected by specific welfare reforms over time.
5 Turning to individual level evidence
To overcome the issues highlighted when studying aggregate data, I turn to
individual-level panel data constructed from the USOC study starting in 2009.
5.1 Capturing individual exposure to welfare cuts
The main advantage to using individual-level data is that, in addition to pro-
viding multiple reasonable outcome measures capturing facets of political prefer-
ences, it can be used to construct more refined measures of an individual’s ex-
posure to reforms. The USOC survey contains an “Unearned Income and State
Benefits module,” which asks the respondent questions about their receipt of ben-
efits. This allows the identification of reasonably clean subsets of individuals who
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received benefits of certain types and were thus, exposed to reforms.
The substantive concern for causal identification is selection. Individuals can
be exposed to austerity in three different direct ways. First, individuals who have
received benefits prior to the reform, may lose benefits altogether as a result of
the reforms. Second, individuals who were not receiving benefits, due to a host
of reasons (possibly related to austerity), may start receiving benefits from a now
less generous welfare state. Third, individuals who had already and continuously
received the same benefit prior to a reforms could see a reduction in the value or
quality of the benefit. The main challenge is to distinguish those selection in (or
out) of benefits as a result of the reforms vis-a-vis those whose personal situation
changes for reasons unrelated to the welfare cuts.
5.2 Zooming in on individual benefit reforms
I next discuss three welfare reforms affecting roughly 10 percent of all UK
households, for which I can tackle selection concerns rather well.
Council tax benefit abolishment (CTB) Council tax is a tax levied by local coun-
cils to pay for some public goods (e.g., waste collection). Up until April 2013,
people earning low incomes could be exempted from paying council tax, or they
could receive a rebate. The central government financed this benefit, but it was
canceled without replacement starting with the new fiscal year in 2013. As a re-
sult, an estimated 2.4 million households across the UK were asked to pay the full
council tax for the first time starting in April 2013. The extent of council tax varies
across the UK from council to council, but is usually at least around £1,000 annu-
ally per household. I identify the population of individual households affected by
this reform based on whether they consistently received council tax benefit at all
the times they were surveyed prior to April 2013. This set of individuals was most
likely affected by the abolishment of the council tax benefit and it is unlikely that
results are conflated by endogenous selection. For the estimating equation to be
explored in detail further below, I define a subset of treated individuals as:
Ti,CTB =
8<:1 received council tax benefit prior to April 20130 else
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In addition, the USOC survey instrument consistently asked respondents whether
they were “behind with their council tax payments,” allowing me to provide evi-
dence on a direct reform impact margin.
Disability Living Allowance (DLA) Established in 1992, the Disability Living
Allowance (DLA) was a social security benefit paid to disabled individuals aged
under 65 to help cover the cost of a personal care and/or mobility need due to a
disability. It was a tax-free, non-means tested and non-contributory benefit with an
estimated 3.2 million claimants across the UK by 2012. The Welfare Reform Act of
2012 lead to the replacement of DLA with a new system of benefits called Personal
Independence Payments (PIP). PIP could be claimed by working-age claimants,
and continues to be non-means tested; but involves regular work-capability as-
sessments carried out by private contractors on behalf of the government.
The transfer to the new system caused significant public outcry. While only a
relatively small share of DLA claimants lost their benefit following the reassess-
ment, a change in the quality or conditionality of awards (by requiring regular
work capability checks, for example) affected a non-negligible share of the 73 per-
cent of recipients transitioned to PIP.26 The PIP roll out started from the 28th of
October, 2013 existing beneficiaries from DLA were gradually converted to PIP.
Unfortunately, I do not know when individuals were converted from DLA to PIP,
because these two benefits are lumped together in the benefit-receipt data.
To tackle selection, I focus on the subset of claimants who had a so-called
indefinite award of DLA and, prior to the introduction of PIP, were not required
to regularly reapply for the benefit. I code these lifetime recipients as treated from
the fourth quarter 2013, when the roll-out of PIP started. For the empirical design,
this set of affected individuals is identified as follows:
Ti,DLA =
8<:1 always received either DLA or PIP0 else
Technically, all DLA recipients with a lifetime award should receive a similar mon-
26Department of Works and Pensions (DWP), “Personal Independence Payment: Official Statis-
tics, October 2017”, https://goo.gl/M46Tj6, accessed 23.06.2018.
24
etary award through PIP. Nonetheless, the process and the requirement for assess-
ment are said to have caused significant grievances.27
Bedroom tax (BTX) Housing benefit is a benefit paid to individuals on low in-
come living in social housing, as government-subsidized rental properties are
called in the UK. As of April 2013, all current and future working-age tenants
renting from a local authority, housing association, or other registered ”social land-
lord” ceased to receive help that had previously been available to defray the costs
of a spare room. This provision was also dubbed the “bedroom tax” in the popular
press as it implied that a lot of working-age parents, whose children had moved
out, found themselves living in accommodation with a spare bedroom. The rules
allow one bedroom for each adult couple, for each single person over 16, for each
two children of the same sex under 16 and for each two children of either sex un-
der 10. Significant cuts were imposed on housing benefit for individual recipients
who were found to have a spare room as per these definitions; financial support
to pay rent fell by 14 percent for those found to have one spare bedroom, and by
25 percent for those found to have two or more.
I identify individuals who were most likely affected by the “bedroom tax” as
follows. They must continuously live in social housing (roughly 16.4 percent of the
sample) and, they must have a spare bedroom as per the governments definition
the most recent time they were surveyed before April 2013.28 This defines a simple
treatment indicator used in the various difference-in-difference estimations.
Ti,BTX =
8<:1 lives in social housing with excess bedroom(s) prior April 20130 else
27Anecdotes that generated outrage proliferated in the media. For example, articles re-
ported that wheelchair-bound claimants were asked to attend reassessment appointments in non-
accessible facilities, and claimants with trisomy 21 (Down syndrom) were asked when they “caught
it.” Further, there were concerns about the qualification of the staff of two private firms tasked with
conducting the reassessments. The Independent, “Disability benefit assessors failing to meet Gov-
ernment’s quality standards,” https://goo.gl/uX4yD5, accessed 23.06.2018.
28The requirement of living continuously in social housing is a conservative as some households
attempting to avoid the bedroom tax may have moved to the private rented sector in anticipation.
The spare bedroom indicator is constructed using the information on the household composition
and the age distribution of children allowing a near replication of the governments criteria.
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The bedroom tax was widely debated and affected more than 660,000 households
across the country. To avoid financial losses, the government encouraged house-
holds to “move to accommodation which better reflects the size and composition
of their household.”29 I can directly measure two impact margins relevant to this
benefit cut: the number of bedrooms in the respondent’s accommodation after
April 2013, and further, whether individuals report to be “behind with their rent.”
Combined treatment In addition to using these three groups to define exposure
to treatment Ti,j with j 2 {CTB,DLA,BTX}, I also construct a combined dummy
Ti,ANY that takes on a value of one if a respondent household belongs to either of
these groups. In total, 10 percent of my USOC sample are affected by either of
these three treatments, which is similar compared to the aggregate estimate from
Beatty and Fothergill (2013), suggesting that between 2 million to 3 million house-
holds (around 10 percent of households) were affected by these three measures. I
next discuss the empirical strategy.
5.3 Empirical strategy
As before, I present results from pooled difference-in-difference designs as well
as event studies.
Pooled difference-in-difference I begin by estimating simple pooled difference-
in-differences, across a range of specifications that include different sets of fixed ef-
fects. The least demanding specification will be the equivalent to the specifications
estimated in the previous sections, controlling for district- and region-specific non-
linear time effects, but now exploiting individual-level data. The most demanding
specification, with i indexing an individual, takes the following form:
yi,d,w,t = ai + bd,w,t + g⇥ Posti,j,t ⇥ Ti,j + ei,d,w,t (3)
The inclusion of individual-level fixed effects ai implies that I exploit only within-
individual variation. The time fixed effects, bd,w,t, are very demanding because they
are specific to each of the 378 districts. They thus absorb any district-specific time-
varying shocks affecting outcomes of respondents living in the same districts in a
29DWP Assessment: Under-occupation of social housing, June 2012, https://goo.gl/xFWDqW.
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common fashion. This amounts to estimating more than 12,000 coefficients.30 Im-
portantly, these district-specific time effects also quite richly control for the indirect
exposure to austerity that the analysis of the local multipliers suggested.
The main coefficient of interest is g, which captures changes in the outcome
variables yi,d,w,t after, indicated by Posti,j,t, a benefit cut j became effective for the
subpopulation indicated by Ti,j. The main outcome variable studied yi,d,w,t is a
dummy variable indicating whether respondents reveal a preference toward UKIP.
In addition, I study a range of reform-specific auxiliary outcome measures that
are either immediately relevant to the welfare cuts, or capture political perceptions
more broadly.
Event studies I also estimate a range of event studies for the specific benefit
cuts, using less demanding specifications, but fully exploiting the frequency of the
survey data that arises due to the staggered data collection for the USOC waves.
The estimation specification is as follows:
yi,d,r,w,t = ad + br,w,t +
2015q4
Â
t=2010q1
gt ⇥ Timet ⇥ Ti,j + ei,r,w,t (4)
This specification is almost identical to the specification studied when using
aggregate data with two differences. The time fixed effects br,w,t are resolved at
the quarterly level specific to the survey wave w and region r. I estimate a full
set of quarter time effects gt, to draw event study plots showing how the outcome
variables yi,d,r,w,t evolved over time relative to the timing specific to a reform j.
5.4 Results
I first discuss the results from the pooled difference-in-difference exercise, be-
fore turning to the event studies.
Pooled difference-in-difference The pooled difference-in-difference results are
presented in Table 2. The dependent variable in this table is a dummy indicat-
ing whether an individual expressed support for UKIP. Columns 2-4 provide es-
timates for the three different welfare reforms affecting different subpopulations,
30Such shocks could be austerity-caused closures of libraries or parks. The fixed effects are also
specific to each survey-wave to control for survey-specific idiosyncrasies.
27
while column 1 combines these into a single treatment indicator that is switched
on from April 2013. The different Panels A - C employ different sets of fixed effects
for the estimation. Panel A controls for district and region by survey-wave by time
fixed effects. This empirical design comes closest to the estimations conducted in
the previous sections by exploiting district-level variation. This empirical design
comes closest to the estimations conducted in the previous sections by exploiting
district-level variation. Across the different welfare reforms, the population likely
exposed to a reform is significantly more likely to express support for UKIP af-
ter these reforms became effective. The point estimates are economically sizable
and precisely estimated, indicating that the treated population sees an increase in
the propensity to support UKIP by between 2.6 - 5.1 percentage points. In rela-
tive terms, the propensity to support UKIP increases by between 53 percent and
108 percent (relative to the mean of the dependent variable which stands at 4.7
percent). While the mean of the dependent variable appears low, suggesting that
the effects are driven by a small subpopulation, it should be seen relative to lev-
els of support for other political parties. The Liberal Democrats, the UK’s other
main party, sees support in the USOC population averaging at just 8.2%; hence,
the UKIP figures are not dramatically lower. In the next section, I explore a set of
further outcomes to allay concerns about the validity of the outcome measure.
Panel B only exploits within-district variation, controlling for district by survey
wave by time fixed effects. This effectively controls for any idiosyncratic and time-
varying shocks affecting all residents in a specific districts. Such common shocks
could, e.g. be capturing the indirect economic effects of austerity affecting the
wider local economy or other local shocks. Throughout, the results remain very
similar across the different measures.
In Panel C finally, I only exploit within-individual variation within districts,
controlling for individual-level fixed effects in addition to the district and survey
specific time fixed effects. Though this comes at the cost of losing some statistical
power, the results remain precisely estimated.
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Event studies I next turn to the event studies for the council tax benefit and the
bedroom tax.31 I begin by studying the abolishment of council tax benefit. The
results are presented visually in Figure 6. The left panel presents the average
support for UKIP among those individuals who have consistently received council
tax benefit at all times prior to its abolishment. The vertical line marks the date
from which the council tax benefit was abolished. The propensity to support UKIP
is consistently higher, on average, after the benefit was abolished which most likely
affected this subpopulation. Panel B highlights that this subpopulation is indeed
affected by the benefit cut; the share of individuals in the treated subpopulation
stating that they are behind with their council tax payments rises sharply and in
a very timely fashion. In Appendix Figure A5, I further highlight how, for this
population, a marked and timely significant drop occurs in benefit income and
gross income, while labor income remains unaffected.
Next, I turn to study the effects of the bedroom tax, which affected households
on low incomes living in social housing. The results are presented in Figure 7. The
left panel presents the effects on support for UKIP among the group of individuals
affected by the bedroom tax. While the pattern is noisier, there is a consistent in-
crease in support for UKIP among this subpopulation. The central panel explores
an economic margin directly relevant to those individuals who, likely, saw a cut to
their housing benefit payment: they are significantly more likely to be in arrears
with their rent, suggesting that the cut to housing benefit due to the spare bedroom
increased rent arrears. Lastly, the right panel studies the number of bedrooms as
an outcome variable, which is immediately relevant as the “bedroom tax” could
be avoided if households moved to smaller accommodation. The pattern is quite
consistent, suggesting that households started to move to smaller accommodation;
while moving costs may not be negligible, this suggests that some households may
have been able to avoid some of the direct economic grievances.
31The analysis of the disability living allowance reform is relegated to the Appendix Figure A6.
The subpopulation that most likely was exposed to the reform sees a timely increase in support for
UKIP. While the DLA-to-PIP conversion did not generate direct economic grievances, in particular
for this subpopulation of lifetime DLA claimants, among this set of respondents there is a signifi-
cantly higher increase in perception that “government officials do not care”, which in turn, is also
strongly linked to support UKIP and Leave (see Appendix Tables A10 and A11).
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Together, these results provide further evidence in support of the underlying
common trends assumption inherent to the previously presented difference-in-
difference estimates. I next discuss a few additional robustness checks before
studying broader measures of political dissatisfaction.
Accounting for other shocks While the event studies suggest that there are no
diverging pre-trends, some concerns may remain that the observed effects on sup-
port for UKIP (and the auxiliary outcomes explored in the next section) could be
masking other unobserved and concurrent shocks. A host of these concerns can
be addressed by saturating the main estimation model with additional controls
as is done in Appendix Table A5, where column (1) replicates the corresponding
column (1) in Table 2 for reference. Columns (2) - (4) explore the implications of
controlling for region-by-qualification-group or region-by-economic-activity status
specific time effects. The former accounts for unobservable region and skill-group
specific (labor market) shocks, while the latter accounts for the potential exposure
to multiple concurrent policy shocks. (The economic activity status distinguishes
between 11 different categories, such as being employed, retired, self-employed, a
student, in a family care role, or being unemployed.)
Columns (5) and (6) further aim to account for a potentially (long-delayed)
political response to the 2009 Recession. To address this issue, I construct an iden-
tifier for each distinct economic activity status sequence that appears in the whole
USOC panel. I then allow each such unique group that is identified by a dis-
tinct economic activity status history to have a different set of time effects.32 This
adds to the estimation a further 18,000 unique estimable controls in the most de-
manding specification and renders many observations perfectly collinear. Yet, the
observation that exposure to either of the three reforms increases the propensity
to support for UKIP remains broadly intact.
Refinement of the control group A second refinement of the analysis may con-
sist of restricting the control group. Naturally, this will have implications for the
32This would allow a separate non-linear time trend in political attitudes for certain cohorts. For
example, this would separate groups of individuals who were unemployed throughout the period
of study from those who were, say, unemployed in 2009 and then become and remained employed
again from 2010 onward.
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statistical power especially when estimation the more saturated models. I consider
two such refinements. First, an ad hoc refinement that restricts the control group to
those who at some point in time, have received the respective benefit or could have
received it. An alternative approach to refine the control group uses propensity-
score matching to construct matched pairs. For each reform, I construct matched
pairs, with the matching based on: gender, age, dummy variables for the differ-
ent economic-activity status, the housing-tenure status indicators, a set of features
capturing the educational attainment across the five categories included in the UK
census, along with the log value of pre-treatment monthly benefit income. This
variable implies that matching will compare individuals with similar amounts of
benefit income that differ only with respect to the specific benefit that is undergo-
ing reform and is the subject of study. I impose a caliper of 0.01 to focus on good
matches based on the baseline observables.The results from this exercise are added
as Appendix Table A6, replicating the main results Table 2, but adding the esti-
mates that are obtained restricting the control groups. The analysis highlights that
the results are robust. Unsurprisingly, statistical power is lost when moving from
the less demanding specifications to the most demanding specifications, which ab-
sorb both individual-level and demanding district-level time effects, especially for
the Disability Living Allowance reform and the bedroom tax. This loss of power is
not a substantive concern as, for example, the specification on the matched panel
in column (5) of Panel C, in excess of 18,000 parameters are estimated on a sample
of just over 60,000 observations.
5.5 Broader outcome measures
Expressing political support for UKIP may only be one specific outcome mea-
sure, but the political responses to austerity could be broader.
Support and like or dislike for other parties I first present results capturing
shifts in expressions of support for other political parties. These are presented in
Table 3. Overall, the results suggest that UKIP was a much stronger beneficiary
of the support lost by the Conservatives (see Panel A) than other parties, such
as Labour, which also were also not in government. Support for Labour and the
Liberal Democrats increases weakly among those affected by either of the three
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welfare reforms. There is also a weak reduction in those reporting that they would
not vote for any party if there was an election tomorrow in Panel D. This would
be indicative of a potential increase in turnout that has been suggested to be an
important factor in driving populist support (see Guiso et al., 2018). The analysis
presented in Appendix Table A7 suggests that those who become UKIP supporters
are mostly original supporters of the Conservatives, Labour and a few other parties
but only marginally from among those who initially reported that they support no
party/would not vote. The welfare-reform induced gains for Labour are mostly
drawn from this pool of people.
In Appendix Table A8, I present results drawing on measures of the intensity
of like or dislikes of the three historic main political parties (the Conservatives,
Labour and the Liberal Democrats) on a 10 point Likert scale. The results suggest
that, respondents affected by the combined any welfare reform measure are much
more likely to express a scores indicating strong dislike for the Conservative party.
Perception of politics more broadly In Table 4, I present evidence for three addi-
tional survey questions, asking whether individuals perceive that “Public officials
do not care”, that they “Don’t have a say in what government does” and that “your
vote is unlikely to make a difference”. Each of these auxiliary measures see a sig-
nificant increase among individuals exposed to welfare reforms. Appendix Table
A9 further highlights that the effects of exposure to welfare reforms on these aux-
iliary outcomes go beyond what can be accounted for by an individuals’ political
preferences. As we will see, these auxiliary outcomes are also correlates for Leave
support, even after accounting for an individuals’ political party preference.33
The perception of having no political voice is something that was prominently
leveraged in the EU referendum campaign, with voters being suggested that vot-
ing against EU membership is a vote against the status quo (Ford and Goodwin,
2017). The observed additional effects are consistent with the idea that austerity
contributed to a feeling of disenfranchisement or disconnect from the established
political parties and institutions, and encouraged voters to support more extreme
policy positions or engage in protest voting (Myatt, 2017). Unfortunately, despite
33Appendix Table A10 further highlights that the effects on these auxiliary outcomes are broadly
carried across the three distinct reforms studied.
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the interesting observation of a weak increase in turnout intentions among the
affected population, as I do not observe actual turnout for the 2016 EU referen-
dum to let this observation bear on the data. Nevertheless, as I will show in the
next section, exposure to welfare reforms – as per the above definitions – not only
increased propensity to support UKIP and increased perceived marginalization –
but is further, strongly linked to expressions of support for Leave.
5.6 Welfare reform exposure and support for Leave
The most recent USOC survey wave asked the EU referendum question in
which 43 percent expressed support for Leave. Not surprisingly, UKIP supporters
stand out with 87 percent supporting Leave as suggested by Appendix Figure A7.
I next study the impact of welfare reforms on support for UKIP and Leave jointly.
Empirical approach I set up a two-equation system to study whether exposure
to welfare reforms and support for UKIP and Leave in 2016 can be linked. To do
so, I construct for each individual i, a measure of whether an individual “switched
to UKIP” before or after a reform j became effective. This implies collapsing the
data from an unbalanced panel used in the main difference-in-difference speci-
fication 3 into a two-period panel.34 The two period panel can then simply be
first-differenced to obtain an individual-level cross-section:
DUKIPi,d = bd + gj ⇥ Ti,j + ni,d (5)
The first-differencing implies that time-invariant individual-level characteristics
are accounted for. A second equation studies support for Leave in the cross section
and would constitute the second equation in the system:
Leavei,d = xd + X0ib+ fj ⇥ Ti,j + ei,d (6)
Conceivably, the vector of additional controls Xi should include a set of factors
that would be captured by the individual-level fixed effects implicit in the first-
34Collapsing the data into a two period panel has the added benefit of being a common ad-hoc
approach to solve the inference problems in contexts with serial correlation highlighted in DiD
settings by Bertrand et al. (2004).
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difference estimator. As an ad hoc approach, I saturate equation 6 with a consec-
utively more demanding vector of controls. The system consisting of equations
5 and 6 can then be estimated using a seemingly unrelated regression, which ac-
counts for a potential cross-correlation between ei,d and ni,d and allows me to test
whether f = g. This null hypothesis is expected to be rejected against the alter-
native of g < f as the previous sections suggested that the welfare reforms were
affecting factors contributing to Leave sentiment beyond what is captured by UKIP.
Results The results are presented in Table 5. Moving across the columns, itera-
tively more demanding sets of control variables are added. Column (1) only in-
clude district fixed effects. In column (2), I add qualification group and age fixed
effects. Column (3) adds economic activity status group effects (such as being
employed, unemployed, a full-time student, retired...). Column (4) adds gross-
household-income-decile fixed effects. Column (5) controls for a set of dummy
variables capturing whether individuals reported any of 17 different health condi-
tions. Column (6) focuses on the subset of individuals in employment controlling
for socioeconomic status and sector of employment.
The results suggest that the estimated propensity to support Leave is at least
6.8 percentage points higher among individuals exposed to either of the three
welfare reforms. Throughout, the null hypothesis of f = g is rejected against the
alternative of g < f. This is not surprising, as Appendix Table A11 shows that
the additional outcomes explored in Table 4 and the event studies are also strong
correlates of Leave over and above what can be accounted for by controlling for
the expressed political preferences. Support for UKIP thus likely understates the
extent to which exposure to the welfare reforms contributed to the builtup of Leave
sentiment, which is consistent with the observation in Section 4.35
5.7 Welfare cuts in the broader economic context
The above analysis suggests that austerity and the implied welfare reforms are
important to understanding the changes in the UK’s political landscape in the
run up to the EU referendum. Yet, the underlying economic reasons for why
35Appendix Table A12 further highlights that the results are robust to focusing on the sample of
matched pairs.
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individuals become exposed to welfare reforms (by virtue of becoming reliant on
the welfare state) are much broader. To shed some more light on this and to
connect with the broader literature, I study how income from benefits and labor
have evolved over a longer period, with a focus on the human-capital divide.
Estimating robust trends To do so, I combine data from the USOC study from
2009 with its much smaller precursor, the British Household Panel study (BHPS),
to study an individual-level panel from 2001. I estimate the following specification:
yi,d,r,w,t = ai + bd,w,t +
2015
Â
t=2001
gt ⇥ Timet ⇥ Xi,t + ei,r,w,t (7)
Here, the dependent variable yi,d,r,w,t measures individual i’s monthly labor in-
come, benefits income and gross income over time. The specification controls for
individual respondent fixed effects ai, while also controlling for district by survey
wave and year fixed effects. The coefficients of interests are the point estimates
on gt, capturing the extent to which an individual i’s educational attainment Xi,t
correlates with the evolution of incomes over time.
Results The results are visually presented in Figure 8. Panel A presents the
trends for respondents with no formal qualifications. The figures suggest that
throughout the last 15 years, monthly labor incomes for this group of individu-
als have, in relative terms, declined. The central figure presents the evolution of
monthly benefit income, which has stayed flat for the early years in the 2000s, but
started expanding in 2005. This suggests that, at least in part, the relative secu-
lar decline in labor incomes was cushioned by an expansion of benefit payments
to individuals with low human capital. This trend in benefit growth came to an
abrupt halt in 2011 as austerity took effect. The last column presents gross income,
which includes income from both labor and benefits. For most of the early 2000s
gross income for individuals with low educational attainment declines in relative
terms, yet, as benefit income expands, this trend flattens out. As austerity started
to take effect, in 2014, marked relative declines in gross income occur.
Panel B studies the trends pertaining to respondents who have completed at
least an undergraduate university degree. Labor income for this group of individ-
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uals has trended up significantly over time in an uninterrupted fashion; the same
is true for gross income, shown in the right column. Not surprisingly, benefit
income for this group contracts mostly throughout the 15 years.
Discussion There are three main observations. First, labor income for individu-
als at the lower end of the skill divide declined significantly over time, while labor
income for those at the top end of the human capital divide increased markedly
in relative terms. This is consistent with the literature documenting growing labor
market polarization (Card and DiNardo, 2002; Lemieux, 2006; Goos et al., 2014).
Second, though the welfare state had been responsive, evening out these grow-
ing inequalities for those with low skills, this growth in benefit incomes came to
an abrupt halt as the Conservative-led coalition government’s austerity measures
took effect. As this paper demonstrates, these measures significantly contributed
to the buildup of Leave sentiment (even after controlling for region- and skill-
group-specific labor market shocks). Third, gross income inequality across the
skills divide is likely to have increased substantially since 2010 due to austerity.
The observations are relevant in the context of the existing research studying
the causal drivers behind the rise in populism. A lot of work has focused on the
role of trade-induced manufacturing sector decline (see Autor et al., 2016; Colan-
tone and Stanig, 2018; Dippel et al., 2015). Yet, this can only account for a part
of the story, at least in the context of the UK. In Appendix Figure A8, I show
that the patterns presented in Figure 8 are robust to excluding individuals who
have ever worked in manufacturing, agriculture, or mining. Since these sectors
are most vulnerable to economic pressures due to trade, the fact that the overall
trends in income (from labor and benefits) and gross incomes along the human-
capital divide remain intact suggests that the secular decline in labor incomes for
those with low human capital can not be explained by trade integration alone.
Other factors beyond trade integration that are likely to feature among additional
explanations of the trends documented here are: structural transformation (Roger-
son, 2008; Rodrik, 2016), the rise of automation (Caprettini and Voth, 2015; Graetz
and Michaels, 2015), skill-biased technological change more broadly (Acemoglu,
1998; Autor et al., 2003), the rise of the gig economy, or, possibly, some forms of
36
migration (Becker and Fetzer, 2018; Dustmann et al., 2013).
Importantly, the results suggest that an active welfare state can help mitigate
the growing skill bias in labor markets (to which trade integration has likely con-
tributed). In the context of the UK, the results suggest that cuts to the welfare state
since 2010 likely activated already existing grievances and resentment.
6 Conclusion
The UK’s 2016 vote to leave the European Union is a watershed moment. It
marks an end to a 70-year-long process of continued economic and political inte-
gration in Europe. Understanding the causes for why the UK’s electorate voted to
leave the EU is of utmost importance – not only for the UK as it redefines its rela-
tionship with Europe – but for many other European countries that see a growth
in support for political parties campaigning on anti-EU political platforms.
This paper presents evidence suggesting that austerity policies from late 2010
onward are key to understanding “Brexit.” The welfare reforms are a strong driv-
ing factor behind the growing support for the populist UKIP party in the wake of
the EU referendum, contributed to the development of broader anti-establishment
preferences and are strongly associated with higher levels of support for Leave.
The results suggest that the EU referendum either may not have taken place, or,
as back-of-the-envelope calculations suggests, could have resulted in a victory for
Remain, had it not been for austerity.
While exposure to austerity-induced welfare reforms is a key activating factor
contributing to the buildup of leave sentiment, and to support for populist par-
ties, the underlying economics causes of the growing reliance and exposure of
(especially low-skilled) individuals on the welfare state are of key relevance to the
broader public and political debate. This paper provides some suggestive aux-
iliary evidence indicating that factors contributing to the growing skill-divide in
labor markets are likely to go beyond trade-integration alone, which is a key driver
explored in an important growing literature.
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Figure 3: Non-parametric effect of educational qualification, socio-economic status,
and sectoral employment of the resident population as of 2001 on support for UKIP
over time
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. Panel A uses the share of the
resident population with no formal qualifications as of 2001 with mean 0.28 (0.06 sd). Panel B uses the share of the resident
population in Routine jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification of Occupations as of 2001 with mean 0.1 (0.03
sd). Panel C uses the share of the resident working age population employed in the Retail sector with mean 0.17 (0.02 sd),
while panel D uses the share of the resident working age population employed in Manufacturing with mean 0.15 (0.05 sd).
The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these cross sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All
regression include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure 5: Non-parametric effect of austerity on support for UKIP overall and by
individual measures.
Panel A: Overall austerity shock Panel B: Council Tax Benefit
Panel C: Disability Living Allowance Panel D: Bedroom Tax
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in English and Welsh local council elections from 2000-
2015. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these simulated incidence of the austerity measures and a
set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region by year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Table 1: The Impact of different austerity measures on support for UKIP across Local,
European and Westminster elections
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UKIP vote share in... Overall TC CB CTB DLA BTX
Panel A: Local elections
1(Year>2010) ⇥ Austerity 0.014 0.081 0.036 0.128 0.166 0.162
(0.003) (0.013) (0.044) (0.036) (0.031) (0.086)
Avg effect 6.460 7.116 2.587 .9208 6.084 1.747
SD 1.747 1.903 .3405 .9960 2.028 .9033
Mean of DV 4.49 4.49 4.49 4.49 4.49 4.49
Local authority districts 345 346 346 346 346 346
Observations 3260 3263 3263 3263 3263 3263
Panel B: European elections
1(Year>2010) ⇥ Austerity 0.008 0.049 0.054 0.060 0.128 0.001
(0.002) (0.009) (0.028) (0.028) (0.018) (0.047)
Avg effect 3.692 4.297 3.893 .4322 4.672 .0086
SD .9988 1.149 .5125 .4676 1.557 .0044
Mean of DV 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1
Local authority districts 378 379 379 379 379 379
Observations 1134 1137 1137 1137 1137 1137
Panel C: Westminster elections
1(Year>2010) ⇥ Austerity 0.008 0.076 -0.025 0.043 0.178 0.064
(0.002) (0.009) (0.025) (0.030) (0.021) (0.041)
Avg effect 3.978 7.00 -1.810 .397 6.664 .764
SD .984 1.72 .226 .354 2.062 .374
Mean of DV 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03
Harmonized Constituencies 566 566 566 566 566 566
Observations 2047 2047 2047 2047 2047 2047
Avg Loss per working age adult 447.1 87.97 71.52 7.21 36.57 10.81
Affected HH. in 1000s 4507 7601 2436 499 660
Correlation with...
No qualification share .75 .17 .51 .77 .58
Routine job share .6 .12 .27 .62 .43
Retail sector share .35 .28 .02 .21 .08
Manufacturing sector share .3 .11 -.03 .37 .24
Notes: Table reports results from a panel OLS regressions with the dependent variable being UKIP’s vote
share in English and Welsh Local Elections from 2000 to 2015 in Panel A, European Elections in Panel
B and Westminster Elections in Panel C. The regressions control for local authority district fixed effects
in Panels A and B, and harmonized constituency level in panel C as well as region by year fixed effects
throughout. Standard errors clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level in Panel A and B
and at the Harmonized Constituency level in Panel C, with standard errors presented in parentheses.
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Table 2: The Impact of different austerity measures on support for UKIP: exploit-
ing individual level data
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (3)
support UKIP Any CTB DLA BTX
Panel A:
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.028 0.026 0.051 0.027
(0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.006)
Mean of DV .0472 .0472 .0472 .0469
Local election districts 379 379 379 379
Observations 252642 252642 252642 245352
District FE & Region x Wave x Time FE x x x x
Panel B:
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.026 0.025 0.043 0.026
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.006)
Mean of DV .0472 .0472 .0472 .0469
Local election districts 379 379 379 379
Observations 252642 252642 252642 245352
District x Wave x Time FE x x x x
Panel C:
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.019 0.019 0.030 0.016
(0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006)
Mean of DV .0472 .0472 .0472 .0469
Local election districts 379 379 379 379
Observations 252642 252642 252642 245352
Individual FE & District x Wave x Time FE x x x x
Notes: Table reports results from a panel OLS. The dependent variable is a dummy variable
taking the value 1 in case a respondent expresses support for UKIP. The columns indicate the
different welfare reforms we study. Panel A controls for district by Region x Wave x Time fixed
effects, thus exploiting between district and between individual variation. Panel B controls for
District x Wave x Time Fixed effects, thus only exploiting between individual variation within a
district. Panel C controls for Respondent fixed effects and District x Wave x Time Fixed Effects,
exploiting only within-individual- and within district variation. Standard errors clustered at the
Local Government Authority District Level are presented in parentheses.
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Table 3: The Impact of different austerity measures on support for other par-
ties: Exploiting individual level data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any CTB DLA BTX
Panel A: Support for Conservatives
Post ⇥ Benefit cut -0.023 -0.019 -0.022 -0.027
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
Mean of DV .259 .259 .259 .261
Local election districts 379 379 379 379
Observations 252642 252642 252642 245352
Panel B: Support for Labour
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.014 0.017 -0.004 0.011
(0.005) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008)
Mean of DV .351 .351 .351 .348
Local election districts 379 379 379 379
Observations 252642 252642 252642 245352
Panel C: Support for Liberal Democrats
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.008 0.004 -0.003 0.013
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005)
Mean of DV .0815 .0815 .0815 .0828
Local election districts 379 379 379 379
Observations 252642 252642 252642 245352
Panel D: Support for No party
Post ⇥ Benefit cut -0.010 -0.015 0.009 -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008)
Mean of DV .193 .193 .193 .193
Local election districts 379 379 379 379
Observations 252642 252642 252642 245352
Individual FE x x x x
District x Wave x Time FE x x x x
Notes: Table reports results from a panel OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a
dummy indicating individual USOC respondent’s support for the Conservatives (panel A),
the Labour party (panel B) and the Liberal Democratic party (panel C). The regressions in-
clude various different levels of fixed effects indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard
errors clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level are presented in parenthe-
ses.
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Table 4: Wider measures of perceptions of disenfranchisement and turnout:
included only in some waves of the USOC study
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Public officials dont care
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.078 0.073 0.051
(0.020) (0.021) (0.040)
Mean of DV 3.37 3.37 3.37
Local election districts 378 378 378
Observations 75547 75547 75547
Panel B: Don’t have say in what govt does
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.096 0.093 0.068
(0.020) (0.021) (0.041)
Mean of DV 3.34 3.34 3.34
Local election districts 378 378 378
Observations 75897 75897 75897
Panel C: Your vote is unlikely to make a difference
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.020 0.021 0.020
(0.011) (0.011) (0.022)
Mean of DV .563 .563 .563
Local election districts 378 378 378
Observations 74948 74948 74948
District FE x
Region x Wave x Time FE x
District x Wave x Time FE x x
Individual FE x
Notes: Table reports results from a panel OLS regressions. The dependent variable in Panel A
and B is a score on a 5 point likert scale (strongly disagree - strongly agree). In Panel C it is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents indicate that they think it is unlikely that their vote
makes a difference. Standard errors clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level
are presented in parentheses.
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Table 5: Support for Leave among individuals exposed to any of the three welfare reform measures
studied
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leave
Benefit cut f 0.182 0.091 0.082 0.068 0.072 0.104
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.022)
Switch to UKIP
Benefit cut g 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.023
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
f = g p-value 0 0 0 0 .001 0
Local election districts 375 375 375 375 375 373
Observations 30364 29750 29725 29367 22643 12770
District FE x x x x x x
Qualifications & Age FE x x x x x
Economic Activity Status FE x x x x
Income Decile FE x x x
Health conditions x x
Socio-economic status & Employment Sector FE x
Notes: Table reports reports seemingly unrelated regression results on the system consisting of equations 5 and 6 studying
individuals supporting leave and switching to UKIP jointly. The sample gets successively smaller as more control variables
get added that are not available across the full sample. In case a variable is not reported on in the wave asking the referendum
question I use the value recorded in the most recent time this variable was observed for an individual to maximize the sample
size. Standard errors clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level are presented in parentheses.
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This appendix is subdivided into three sections. Section A presents further ro-
bustness checks and additional results as figures or tables that were omitted from
the main paper due to space constraints. These results are directly referred to in
the main text and discussed in the main body or in footnotes. Section B presents
further descriptions of the underlying data as well as additional background mate-
rials. The relevant sections are referred to in the main text. Section C presents a set
of auxiliary results only indirectly referred to in the main text, they are discussed
in detail in this appendix section.
A Further Robustness Checks and Additional Results
1
Figure A1: UKIP Election Result in 2014 EP elections and EU referendum vote
leave.
Notes: This figure is reproduced from Appendix Figure A2 in (Becker et al., 2017). The R-squared of a univariate cross-
sectional regression of support for Leave and UKIP vote share in the 2014 elections is 75%, and the point estimate is a near
straight line with an intercept of 15 percentage points, suggesting that UKIP EP vote share plus 15% does a reasonably good
job predicting the EU referendum vote share for Leave.
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Figure A4: Effect of Austerity on Local Area Gross Value Added per capita
Notes: The dependent variable is the log value of the gross value added per working age adult in a local authority area
between 2000 to 2015. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between the overall simulated local authority area
austerity incidence and a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1
region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A6: Impact of “disability living allowance” conversion starting October 28
2013 on support for UKIP
Notes: Figure plots event studies studying the impact of the abolishment of council tax benefit on previous recipients. The
dependent variable in the left panel is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent revealed a political preference
in support of UKIP. The dependent panel in the right hand side is an indicator variable indicating whether the respondent
is behind with his or her council tax payments. The regressions control for counil by survey wave by time fixed effects. The
graph plots point estimates of the interaction between an indicator variable indicating whether the individual respondents
received council tax benefit at each point in time in the three years prior to the reform in which they were observed in
the sample interacted with an indicator for the survey quarter. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90%
confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A7: Support for Leave in EU referendum by respondent’s political party
preference
Notes: The plot presents sample averages of Leave support in Wave 8 of the USOC survey by the respondents expressed
political support for UKIP, the Conservatives, Labour or the Liberal Democrats at the earliest instance and the latest instance.
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Table A1: Summary statistics of main variables used
Panel A: District level
Fstats
Mean SD N
Local election % for UKIP 4.454 7.571 3290.000
EL % UKIP 21.118 9.397 1140.000
% with No qual (2001) 0.286 0.062 346.000
% working in Routine occ (2001) 0.102 0.030 346.000
% working in Retail (2001) 0.169 0.021 346.000
% working in Manuf (2001) 0.154 0.054 346.000
Total Austerity Impact 447.122 121.110 378.000
Tax Credit Cuts 87.971 23.563 379.000
Child Benefit Cut 71.517 9.425 379.000
Council Tax Benefit Cut 7.211 7.810 379.000
Disability Living Allowance 36.570 12.204 379.000
Bedroom Tax 10.813 5.597 379.000
Panel B: Individual level
Mean SD N
Ti,CTB 0.064 0.244 348188
Ti,DLA 0.018 0.135 348188
Ti,BTX 0.057 0.232 325769
support UKIP 0.047 0.212 252642
support Conservatives 0.259 0.438 252642
support Labour 0.351 0.477 252642
support Lib-Dems 0.082 0.274 252642
support Neither party 0.193 0.395 252642
Like/Dislike Conservatives 3.530 2.620 75078
Like/Dislike Labour 4.093 2.636 75194
Like/Dislike LibDems 3.067 2.282 73784
Public officals dont care 3.367 0.977 75547
No say in what govt does 3.338 1.045 75897
Vote doesnt make diff 3.294 3.215 74948
10
Table A2: Robustness of the Impact of different austerity measures on support for UKIP
across Local, European and Westminster elections: Adding district specific linear time
trends
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UKIP vote share in... Overall TC CB CTB DLA BTX
Panel A: Local
1(Year>2010) ⇥ Austerity 0.005 0.038 0.096 0.049 0.054 0.055
(0.002) (0.012) (0.039) (0.034) (0.028) (0.070)
Mean of DV 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Local authority districts 341 342 342 342 342 342
Observations 3216 3219 3219 3219 3219 3219
Panel B: European
1(Year>2010) ⇥ Austerity 0.003 0.031 0.018 0.023 0.070 -0.055
(0.003) (0.014) (0.036) (0.038) (0.027) (0.058)
Mean of DV 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1
Local authority districts 374 375 375 375 375 375
Observations 1122 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125
Panel C: Westminster
1(Year>2010) ⇥ Austerity 0.010 0.081 -0.016 0.073 0.164 0.118
(0.002) (0.010) (0.031) (0.035) (0.024) (0.051)
Avg effect 4.573 7.535 -1.133 .662 6.1364 1.413
SD 1.131 1.847 .141 .591 1.899 .691
Mean of DV 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03 6.03
Harmonized Constituencies 566 566 566 566 566 566
Observations 2047 2047 2047 2047 2047 2047
Avg Loss per working age adult 447.1 87.97 71.52 7.21 36.57 10.81
Affected HH. in 1000s 4507 7601 2436 499 660
Correlation with...
No qualification share .75 .17 .51 .77 .58
Routine job share .6 .12 .27 .62 .43
Retail sector share .35 .28 .02 .21 .08
Manufacturing sector share .3 .11 -.03 .37 .24
Notes: Table reports results from a panel OLS regressions with local authority area and region by year
fixed effects. The dependent variable is UKIP’s vote share in the Local Elections from 2000 to 2015.
Standard errors clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level are presented in parentheses.
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Table A4: Austerity, UKIP and support for Leave in 2016: Explor-
ing changes in UKIP support across Local, European and Westminster
elections
Dependent variable: Leave vote share in 2016 (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Local Elections
Austerity 0.029 0.016
(0.004) (0.004)
DUKIP 0.912 0.824
(0.070) (0.080)
Mean of DV 54.6 54.6 54.6
Observations 322 322 322
Panel B: European Elections
Austerity 0.028 0.016
(0.004) (0.003)
DUKIP 1.868 1.754
(0.090) (0.099)
Mean of DV 53.2 53.2 53.2
Observations 378 378 378
Panel C: Westminster elections
Austerity 0.021 0.002
(0.004) (0.003)
DUKIP 1.704 1.691
(0.089) (0.093)
Mean of DV 53.8 53.8 53.8
Observations 528 528 528
Notes: The dependent variable throughout is a measure of Leave support measured
at the district level in Panel A and B, at the constituency level using the estimates
constructed by Hanretty (2017) in Panel C. Austerity refers to the main austerity
shock measure used in Section 4. D UKIP in Panel A measures the change in support
for UKIP between the 2009 and 2014 EP elections, the change in support for UKIP
between the 2009-2012 and 2013-2015 time windows in local elections in Panel B.
In Panel C, it measures the change in support for UKIP between 2010 and 2015
Westminster elections. All regressions control for region fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level in Panel A and B
and at the Harmonized Constituency level in Panel C, are presented in parentheses.
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Table A7: Effect of austerity on political preferences: Studying the original political pref-
erences of supporters of different political parties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UKIP Conservatives Labour Lib Dems No party
Initial party preference...
Conservatives ⇥ Post ⇥ Any 0.049 -0.078 0.026 0.007 0.002
(0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011)
Labour ⇥ Post ⇥ Any 0.042 -0.012 -0.018 -0.006 0.008
(0.018) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.017)
Lib Dems ⇥ Post ⇥ Any 0.012 -0.023 0.017 0.001 -0.007
(0.036) (0.020) (0.022) (0.010) (0.029)
None ⇥ Post ⇥ Any 0.010 -0.029 0.019 -0.001 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007)
Other ⇥ Post ⇥ Any 0.050 -0.065 0.004 0.003 0.015
(0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
UKIP ⇥ Post ⇥ Any 0.005 -0.040 0.012 -0.006 0.040
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.013)
Mean of DV .0479 .263 .351 .0818 .187
Local authority districts 374 374 374 374 374
Observations 227029 227029 227029 227029 227029
Individual FE x x x x x
District x Region x Time FE x x x x x
Notes: Table reports results from a panel OLS. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 in case a respondent expresses support for the party provided in the column head (either stating
they are a supporter, feel close or would vote for the party if there was a general election tomorrow). The
underlying regression interacts the individual level exposure to welfare reforms studied in Table 2 with a
baseline measure of an individual’s stated political party preference recorded the first time the respondents
contribute to the USOC study. Standard errors clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level
are presented in parentheses.
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Table A8: Effect of exposure to welfare cuts on like/ or dislike of the
established political parties: included only in Wave 2, 3 and 6 in USOC
study
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Like or dislike Conservatives
Post ⇥ Benefit cut -0.196 -0.243 -0.192
(0.052) (0.057) (0.097)
Mean of DV 3.53 3.53 3.53
Local election districts 378 378 378
Observations 75078 75078 75078
Panel B: Like or dislike Labour
Post ⇥ Benefit cut -0.038 -0.050 -0.027
(0.056) (0.060) (0.097)
Mean of DV 4.09 4.09 4.09
Local election districts 378 378 378
Observations 75194 75194 75194
Panel C: Like or dislike Liberal Democrats
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.063 0.004 0.008
(0.047) (0.050) (0.094)
Mean of DV 3.07 3.07 3.07
Local election districts 378 378 378
Observations 73784 73784 73784
District FE ⇥
Region x Wave x Time FE ⇥
District x Wave x Time FE ⇥ ⇥
Individual FE ⇥
Notes: Table reports results from a OLS regressions. The dependent variable capture
the extent to which respondents like or dislike one of the three main political parties.
They are measured on a 10 point Likert scale ranging from strong dislike to strongly
like. Standard errors clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level are
presented in parentheses.
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Table A9: Effects of benefit cut exposure on wider measures of perceptions of
disenfranchisement controlling for individual level political party preferences
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Public officials dont care
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.056 0.068 0.047
(0.022) (0.023) (0.046)
Mean of DV 3.37 3.37 3.37
Local election districts 374 374 374
Observations 66001 66001 66001
Panel B: Don’t have say in what govt does
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.071 0.080 0.060
(0.022) (0.024) (0.048)
Mean of DV 3.33 3.33 3.33
Local election districts 374 374 374
Observations 66237 66237 66237
Panel C: Your vote is unlikely to make a difference
Post ⇥ Benefit cut 0.006 0.009 0.014
(0.011) (0.012) (0.026)
Mean of DV .553 .553 .553
Local election districts 374 374 374
Observations 66659 66659 66659
Individual level political party preference x x x
District FE x
Region x Wave x Time FE x
District x Wave x Time FE x x
Individual FE x
Notes: Table reports results from a panel OLS regressions. The individual level political party
preference controls for time-varying individual level political party preference for Labour, the
Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats, UKIP or No Party. The dependent variable in Panel A
and B is a score on a 5 point likert scale (strongly disagree - strongly agree). In Panel C it is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents indicate that they think it is unlikely that their vote
makes a difference. Standard errors clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level
are presented in parentheses.
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Table A11: Alternative broader outcome measures and support for Leave across different control vari-
ables: Controlling for political party preferences
Dependent variable: Leave support (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public officials don’t care 0.040 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.026 0.021
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Don’t have a say in what government does 0.033 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.024
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
My vote doesnt matter 0.006 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Behind with council tax 0.069 0.066 0.060 0.051 0.061 0.036
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025)
Behind with rent 0.021 0.015 0.012 0.001 0.008 -0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022)
f = g p-value
Local election districts 373 373 373 373 372 372
Observations 18422 18388 18370 18169 13737 9327
Political party preferences x x x x x x
District FE x x x x x x
Qualifications & Age FE x x x x x
Economic Activity Status FE x x x x
Income Decile FE x x x
Health conditions x x
Socio-economic status & Employment Sector FE x
Notes: Table reports results from a cross-sectional OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether
respondents stated that they support Leaving the EU. The sample gets successively smaller as more control variables get
added that are not available across the full sample. In case a variable is not reported on in a specific wave, the most recent
time a control variable is observed for an individual in the panel is used. Standard errors clustered at the Local Government
Authority District Level are presented in parentheses.
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B Data Description and Additional Background Ma-
terial
B.1 Council elections
The data for district elections in Great Britain is taken from The Elections Cen-
tre. It contains comprehensive data on local government elections since 1973. Since
1999, there have been several changes in local government structure, and these
have been accounted for in constructing the panel.
The current local government structure includes both two-tier and single-tier
components. In England, there are 27 upper-tier county councils with 201 lower-
tier district councils. Additionally, there are 32 London Boroughs, the City of Lon-
don, 36 metropolitan boroughs (or districts), and 55 unitary authorities (UA), all
of which operate on a single-tier basis. Since 1994, there are 22 unitary authorities
in Wales and 32 unitary authorities in Scotland. While most responsibilities are
split between counties and districts in two-tier authorities, single-tier authorities
must provide all the services . In constructing the sample, this paper includes all
election results at the district council and single-tier authority level between 2000
and 2015.
Elections are organized by subdivisions of local authorities called electoral
wards or electoral divisions. Each ward is represented by one or more elected
councillors. Although in all cases councillors serve 4 year terms, there are three
distinct systems of elections. First, elections may happen every four years for all
councillors. Second, elections may happen for a third of the councillors every year,
with no election in the fourth year. In this case, the fourth year is used for county
council elections. Third, half of the councillors may be elected every two years .
In terms of voting system, England and Wales use First Past the Post, while the
Single Transferable Vote system is used in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In the
analysis, a system of elections every four years starting in 2000 is treated separately
from a system with elections every four years starting in 2000. Thus, all additional
variation is taken into account with “election wave” fixed effects, which control for
differences between authorities with different elections structures and sequences.
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The main change in the structure of local government since 2000 was the in-
troduction of nine new unitary authorities in England in 2009. These changes
are summarized in the table below. In the first five county councils, the lower
tier district councils were abolished, and all functions were undertaken by the new
unitary authority of the same name. In Bedfordshire, Mid- and South Bedfordshire
merged to form the Central Bedfordshire UA. Bedford attained UA status, having
previously been a district. In Cheshire, the unitary authority of Cheshire West and
Chester was formed from the districts of Ellesmere Port and Neston, Vale Royal,
and Chester. The districts of Macclesfield, Congleton and Crewe and Nantwich
merged to form Cheshire East. In order to compare the regions before and after
these reforms, district-level results were merged into the current UA boundaries
between 2000 and 2008. There is no concern of overlap, as no district council was
split to form the new unitary authorities.
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Table B1: Changes to district councils since 2000
County Council (before 2009) District Councils New Unitary Authority (After 2009)
(Before 2009)
Cornwall Caradon Cornwall
Carrick
Kerrier
North Cornwall
Penwith
Restormel
Durham Cheshire-le-Street Durham
City of Durham
Derwentside
Easington
Sedgefield
Teeside
Wear Valley
Northumberland Alnwick Northumberland
Berwick-upon-Tweed
Blyth Valley
Castle Morpeth
Tynedale
Wansbeck
Shropshire Bridgnorth Shropshire
North Shropshire
Oswestry
Shrewsbury and Atcham
South Shropshire
Wiltshire Kennet Wiltshire
North Wiltshire
Salisbury
West Wiltshire
Bedfordshire Mid Bedfordshire Bedford
South Bedfordshire Central Bedfordshire
Cheshire Chester Cheshire West and Chester
Congleton Cheshire East
Crewe and Nantwich
Ellesmere Port and Neston
Macclesfield
Vale Royal
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B.2 Political preferences elicited through the USOC survey
I take advantage of the USOC politics module that is included in Waves 1-7 of
the USOC panel study. Wave 8 of the study includes the EU referendum question,
but, unfortunately, does not include the politics module.
The key value added of working with individual level panel data lies in the fact
that I can fully zoom in on changes in political preferences within an individual.
The instrument used for each USOC survey round contains a Politics module that
elicits political preferences through a sequence of questions. These are presented
in Figure B1. The enumerator asks the respondents first, whether an individual is
a supporter of a political party. If the respondent says yes, they enquire which is
the political party.
In case respondents said that they are not a supporter of a specific party, the
enumerator asks whether the respondent sees him- or herself closer to one party
or another. If that is the case, the enumerator asks, which political party that is.
Only if a respondent is neither a supporter of a political party or feeling closer
to one party over another one, the enumerator asks, which party would the re-
spondent vote for in case there was an election.
In the face-to-face interviews, respondents are not directly prompted with party
names from a menu, but rather respondents are asked to provide the party name,
which the enumerator ticks on the survey questionnaire or, alternatively, details.
In waves 1-3, the conversion of the survey questionnaires (containing the detailed
party names) to digital files, did not separately code UKIP, but rather, included
a broad category ”Other” – the other main parties, in particular, Labour, Conser-
vatives, Liberal Democrats, Greens, Plaid Cymru, Scottish Nationalists as well as
Sinn Fein for Northern Ireland are always consistently coded.
Conversations with the UK Data Service handling the USOC data confirms
that most of the Other-coded responses prior to wave 3 were supporters of UKIP
or the British Nationalist Party (BNP). From Wave 4 onwards, UKIP is separately
coded and the pool of respondents in the maintained ”Other” category collapses
once UKIP is separately coded. To be consistent throughout, I include the Other
category into the count of UKIP supporters from Wave 4 onwards as well, which
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likely adds some noise to the dependent variable.
This narrow module is complemented with a more detailed Political engagement
module in wave 2, 3 and 6. The political engagement module includes six further
survey questions explored in this paper.
• ”Public officials don’t care” – respondents are asked to (strongly) disagree or
(strongly) agree with this statement on a 5 point Likert scale.
• ”I don’t have a say in what the government does” – respondents are asked to
(strongly) disagree or (strongly) agree with this statement on a 5 point Likert
scale.
• Perceived political influence – respondents are asked “On a scale from 0 to
10, where 0 means very unlikely and 10 means very likely, how likely is
it that your vote will make a difference in terms of which party wins the
election in this constituency at the next general election?” – in this paper I
code respondents reporting are score weakly lower than 3 as perceiving that
their vote is unlikely to make a difference.
• Party likes- and dislikes – respondents are asked for each of the three main
parties (Conservative/Labour/ Liberal Democrats) ”On a scale from 0 to 10,
where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, how do you feel
about the ... Party ?”
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Figure B1: Schematic of USOC survey instrument eliciting political party prefer-
ences
Notes: Schematic presenting the structure of the USOC survey instrument eliciting political party preferences of individual
respondent.
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B.3 Simulated welfare-reform impact measures and reforms stud-
ied
The simulated impact of the welfare reformmeasures leverages data constructed
by Beatty and Fothergill (2013). They study seven actual reforms that were imple-
mented, mostly through the 2012 Welfare Reform Act, many of which became
effective starting in early 2013.
• Housing Benefit - Local Housing Allowance - Changes to the rules governing
assistance with the cost of housing for low-income households in the private
rented sector. The new rules apply to rent levels, ‘excess’ payments, property
size, age limits for sole occupancy, and indexation for inflation.
• Housing Benefit - Under-occupation - New rules governing the size of prop-
erties for which payments are made to working age claimants in the social
rented sector (widely known as the ‘bedroom tax’)
• Non-dependant deductions - Increases in the deductions from Housing Ben-
efit, Council Tax Benefit and other income-based benefits to reflect the con-
tribution that non-dependant household members are expected to make to-
wards the household’s housing costs
• Household benefit cap - New ceiling on total payments per household, ap-
plying to the sum of a wide range of benefits for working age claimants
• Council Tax Benefit - Reductions in entitlement of working age claimants
arising from 10 per cent reduction in total payments to local authorities
• Disability Living Allowance - Replacement of DLA by Personal Indepen-
dence Payments (PIP), including more stringent and frequent medical tests,
as the basis for financial support to help offset the additional costs faced by
individuals with disabilities
• Incapacity benefits - Replacement of Incapacity Benefit and related benefits
by Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), with more stringent medical
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tests, greater conditionality and time- limiting of non-means tested entitle-
ment for all but the most severely ill or disabled
• Child Benefit - Three-year freeze, and withdrawal of benefit from households
including a higher earner
• Tax Credits - Reductions in payment rates and eligibility for Child Tax Credit
and Working Families Tax Credit, paid to lower and middle income house-
holds
• 1 per cent up-rating - Reduction in annual up-rating of value of most working-
age benefits
Impact measures For each of these reforms, the UK government has estimated
impact estimates at the aggregate level. The main source of this information that
Beatty and Fothergill (2013) use is reports from HM Treasury estimating overall fi-
nancial saving arising from each element of the reforms. These were published in
the official Budget’s or the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Autumn Statement. Ad-
ditional data sources used are Impact Assessment that government departments,
such as, for example, the Department for Works and Pensions, has produced.
Beatty and Fothergill (2013) use these impact assessment to produce local au-
thority level specific estimates of the likely impact. This combines three the official
published ex-ante expected financial saving to the UK Exchequer, the distribution
of benefit claimants between local authorities, and the extent to which claimants
in each local authority are likely to be affected by the reforms.
For the latter, benefit claimant numbers and expenditure by local authority
(incorporating demographic information such as family status and age) is incor-
porated. These data come from the Department of Works and Pensions and HM
Revenues and Customs (the UK tax authorities).
Reforms focused on The paper studies in some detail the ”Housing Benefit -
Under-occupation”, ”Council Tax Benefit” , ”Disability Living Allowance” , ”Child
Benefit” and ”Tax Credits” changes. It also studies the overall implied austerity
impact measure that is constructed combining all these ten measures. The choice
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of the reforms that are studied with more detail is driven by the availability of data
and the ability to be able to capture specific reforms in the individual level data.
The reforms not covered directly are mostly not included due to the difficulty
to identify treated subpopulations in the individual level data. Specifically, for the
reforms to the Local Housing Allowance, this essentially cut benefits to households
living in the private rented sector receiving housing benefits. This involved a
change to the way that the maximum amount eligible for housing benefit support
is computed. Prior to 2013, housing benefit claimants could get support covering
rent up to the median rent in the local authority district; this reference rent was
dropped to the 30th percentile.
A second reform was the Household benefit cap, which introduced a cap on
the maximum benefit income a household could receive. The initial cap was set at
GBP 26,000 (which coincides roughly with the average household income across
the UK) resulting in only a handful of households in the sample period being
affected in the individual level sample. Since fall 2016, the benefit cap was low-
ered by 23% to 20,000. The third benefit reform not explicitly discussed was a
reform to Incapacity benefits – the Employment Support Allowance, which was
another disability benefit reform. This was a reform that was already introduced
by the outgoing labor government in late 2008 already and reinforced by the Coali-
tion government introducing similar work capability assessments as for DLA/PIP,
more conditionality and more time-limits.
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C Auxiliary Results
C.1 Robustness of trend changes in UKIP support
In this appendix, I present a range of robustness checks to highlight that the
trends presented in Section 3 are robust.
Similar trends for EP and Westminster elections While the trends presented in
the main paper focus on the local elections, due to the high frequency of election
results data for local elections, the trend patterns are very similar when studying
EP or Westminster elections. Appendix Figure C1 shows that the marked change
in the correlation structure between UKIP support and measures of poor economic
fundamentals of 2001 constituency boundaries harmonized constituencies are very
similar, with UKIP support picking up markedly in areas with high shares of the
local population with No Qualifications, working in Routine jobs or high shares
of Retail- and Manufacturing sector employment. The same patterns appear when
studying EP elections as evidenced in Figure C2. While, on average, UKIP vote
shares in Local and Westminster elections are mechanically lower (as not all seats
are contested), UKIPs performance in EP elections 2004, 2009 and 2014 stands out
consistently realizing more than 15.6% of the vote.
Functional form The set of fixed effects included in the main specification is
quite demanding. The results are very similar if I control fo more or less demand-
ing time-fixed effects. In particular, Appendix Figures C10 show the estimated
coefficients, when controlling for election-wave by region and year fixed effects.
This set of fixed effects is particularly suitable as it de-facto zooms in on districts
that are on similar rotation schedules for the elections of councillors. Similarly,
Appendix Figure C11) presents results using simple year fixed effects; throughout,
the results patterns are very similar.
Sample balance UKIP does not field candidates in each of the local council elec-
tions. In the overall panel, UKIP is coded has having zero percentage of votes
in case it does not field candidates. The results are however, robust to focusing
on a much more balanced panel, including only districts in which UKIP fielded
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candidates in at least 50% of the elections. These results are presented in Figure
C9, the trends remain very similar. This, taken together with the similar trends
we document for the EP (where candidates are fielded throughout the UK as they
are selected based on the party’s performance in regional lists) and Westminster
elections renders me confident that the results are not masking selection effects.
Broader baseline categories or measures The presentation of trends in Section
3 is condensed to a small set of baseline characteristics Xi,baseline. In this section,
I show that the results are robust to a much richer set of baseline characteristics.
In particular, Appendix Figure C5 shows a richer set of plots for six distinct qual-
ification groups; the increase in support for UKIP is driven by areas that have a
relatively low skill composition of the local resident population, while the reverse
is true for areas with a resident population with higher degrees.
Appendix Figure C6 shows a richer set of plots for the eight distinct socio-
economic status groups that the UK census bureau distinguishes. The Census
bureau categorizes individual occupations and job titles into these socio-economic
status groups, following the Goldthorpe classification system from sociology.
Appendix Figure C7 presents a broader set of sectors, suggesting that no trend
patterns emerge for areas that have a sizable Health Care or Hotel & Accommoda-
tion sector. Similar positive effects on UKIP are found for the Transportation and
Construction sectors, while the opposite direction shows up for Education and
Real Estate.
In particular, I use refined baseline measures focusing on the qualification pro-
file of the UK-born resident population (as opposed to including foreign borns).
This exercise serves to zoom in on the likely electorate, which is mostly drawn
from the UK-born resident population, despite EU citizens being entitled to vote
in local elections. These results are presented in Appendix Figure C12 and provide
very similar patterns.
C.2 Where do UKIP voters come from?
The EU referendum was announced in early 2013 by the Conservative Prime
Minister David Cameron, on condition of winning a majority in the 2015 election.
This suggests that UKIP was particularly perceived as a threat to the Conservative
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party.
Yet, the previous literature suggests that UKIP also attracted supporters from
the Labour party. Similarly, it could be that UKIP was particularly successful in
mobilizing voters that previously did not turn out to vote in elections.
I investigate these in turn.
Empirical specification I build on our previous analysis that documents that
UKIP’s electoral ascent post 2010 is driven by places with weak economic funda-
mentals. I now ask whether these fundamentals, after 2010, explain distinct moves
away from other parties by estimating the following specification
yirt = ai + brt + g⇥ Post 2010⇥ Xi,baseline + eirt (8)
The only difference to the previous specification is that now, we explore a range
of dependent variables yirt. In addition to the UKIP vote shares, we present results
pertaining to turnout, the Conservative-, Labour- and Liberal Democrat party vote
shares. Furthermore, due to space constraints, we present not the full sequence of
non-parametric effects, but rather, focus on a pooled average post 2010 coefficient
estimate g to be presented in table form.
I perform the analysis at the level of local council elections, European Parlia-
mentary elections as well as Westminster elections.
Results The results pertaining to the study of local elections are presented in
Table C1. The results suggest that UKIP’s growth that is captured by the weak
baseline socio-economic characteristics comes mostly at the expense of Conserva-
tive party vote shares as indicated by the negative coefficients in column (3) across
most proxy measures for weak-socio economic fundamentals, with the exception
of the share of residents working in retail.
There is no statistically discernible effect on turnout, suggesting that places
with weak socio-economic fundamentals post 2010 saw no differential voter mo-
bilization from which UKIP could have benefited. If anything, the point estimates
are negative throughout.
This analysis suggests that the Conservative party, in local elections, was losing
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non-negligible numbers of voters to UKIP. This is not surprising, as Conservative
councillors defected to UKIP quite regularly (Webb and Bale, 2014).
I obtain very similar results when studying the performance of UKIP and the
other parties in the European Parliamentary election of 2014 (relative to the earlier
rounds) and the 2015 Westminster election (relative to the 2001, 2005 and 2010
elections). These results are presented in Appendix Tables C2 and C3.
On the timing Since the EU referendum was already announced in January 2013,
it becomes interesting to see whether the link between weak socio-economic funda-
mentals and UKIP votes is already present in the data prior to the announcement,
in particular up to the 2012 local council elections that were held in May 2012.
I restrict the analysis to the two local election rounds in 2011 and 2012 and
present the results in Table C4. The pattern is similar, but also suggests some
distinct differences. We find the same positive link between weak socio-economic
fundamentals and UKIP votes after 2010. It is statistically significant for two of the
four indicators of weak socio-economic fundamentals: for the share of the resident
population with low qualification and for the prevalence of retail employment.
There are some differences in the effects on other parties: while the Conserva-
tive party appears to be contracting in such areas, the Labour party, along with
UKIP actually stands to gain. This suggests that prior to the EU referendum an-
nouncement, in local elections, a growing support for UKIP is associated with a
worse performance for the Conservatives and a better performance for Labour in
areas with weak fundamentals, suggesting that the perceived threat of UKIP, in-
creasing the risk of a shift towards Labour may have been particularly strongly
perceived in the run up to the January 2013 announcement.
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Figure C7: Non-parametric effect of the industry employment structure in 2001 on
support for UKIP over time
Panel A: Education Panel B: Real Estate
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Transport
Panel E: Construction Panel F: Manufacturing
Panel G: Hotel & Accommodation Panel H: Health care
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. The independent variables are
the respective shares of the resident working age population in a district that is working in any of the different sectors as of
2001 interacted with a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region
by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure C8: Non-linear time trend in support for UKIP after partialing out non-linear
trend in baseline manufacturing sector prevalence and import-shock
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. Panel A uses the share of
the resident UK born population with no formal qualifications as of 2001. Panel B uses the share of the UK born resident
population in Routine jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification of Occupations as of 2001. The graph plots
point estimates of the interaction between these two cross sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression
include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region by year fixed effects, in addition to year effects interacted
with the baseline size of the manufacturing sector in terms of employment as of 2001 as well as the Colantone and Stanig
(2018) import competition measure. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure C9: Robustness to balanced sample of elections – Non-parametric effect of
educational qualification, socio-economic status, and sectoral employment of the
resident population as of 2001 on support for UKIP over time
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. The sample is restricted to
only include elections where UKIP ran across districts in which UKIP contested at least 50% of the races. Panel A uses the
share of the resident population with no formal qualifications as of 2001. Panel B uses the share of the resident population
in Routine jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification of Occupations as of 2001. Panel C uses the share of the
resident working age population employed in the Retail sector, while panel D uses the share of the resident working age
population employed in Manufacturing. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these cross sectional
measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and election wave by
NUTS1 region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure C10: Robustness to controlling for more demanding time effects: Election
wave by Region by Year – Non-parametric effect of educational qualification, socio-
economic status, and sectoral employment of the resident population as of 2001 on
support for UKIP over time
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. Panel A uses the share of the
resident population with no formal qualifications as of 2001. Panel B uses the share of the resident population in Routine
jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification of Occupations as of 2001. Panel C uses the share of the resident
working age population employed in the Retail sector, while panel D uses the share of the resident working age population
employed in Manufacturing. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these cross sectional measures and
a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and election wave by NUTS1 region by
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
44
Figure C11: Robustness to controlling for less demanding time effects: Year FE
– Non-parametric effect of educational qualification, socio-economic status, and
sectoral employment of the resident population as of 2001 on support for UKIP
over time
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. Panel A uses the share of the
resident population with no formal qualifications as of 2001. Panel B uses the share of the resident population in Routine
jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification of Occupations as of 2001. Panel C uses the share of the resident
working age population employed in the Retail sector, while panel D uses the share of the resident working age population
employed in Manufacturing. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these cross sectional measures and
a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure C12: Robustness to measurement of baseline characteristics - Focusing on
UK born population shares – Non-parametric effect of educational qualification,
socio-economic status, and sectoral employment of the resident population as of
2001 on support for UKIP over time
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. Panel A uses the share of
the UK born resident population with no formal qualifications as of 2001. Panel B uses the share of the UK born resident
population in Routine jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification of Occupations as of 2001. Panel C uses the
share of the UK born resident working age population employed in the Retail sector, while panel D uses the share of the
UK born resident working age population employed in Manufacturing. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction
between these cross sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed
effects and NUTS1 region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands
indicated.
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Table C1: Where do UKIP voters post 2010 come from? Studying local elections
Other parties
UKIP Turnout Con Lab LD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No qualifications
Post 2010 x Pop. share with No qualifications (2001) 42.746 -2.326 -25.067 -0.226 -3.668
(5.257) (4.373) (5.432) (6.508) (6.392)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 3259 3258 3259 3259 3259
Panel B: Routine jobs
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Routine occupations (2001) 70.572 -8.372 -37.275 -15.666 19.746
(11.375) (8.452) (11.182) (12.075) (13.700)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 3259 3258 3259 3259 3259
Panel C: Retail
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Retail (2001) 109.098 -3.445 -41.989 -36.801 25.956
(13.794) (8.552) (11.774) (16.580) (16.126)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 3259 3258 3259 3259 3259
Panel D: Manufacturing
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Manufacturing (2001) 24.164 -7.087 -7.246 -2.400 18.796
(6.398) (5.710) (7.592) (8.012) (9.786)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 3259 3258 3259 3259 3259
Notes: All regressions control for local authority district and NUTS1 region by time fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted clustering at the local
authority district level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
47
Table C2: Where do UKIP voters post 2010 come from? Studying European Parliamentary elections
Other parties
UKIP Turnout Con Lab LD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No qualifications
Post 2010 x Pop. share with No qualifications (2001) 0.363 0.167 -0.166 0.180 0.000
(0.041) (0.032) (0.025) (0.048) (0.023)
Mean of DV .224 .369 .282 .191 .116
Local election districts 346 346 346 346 346
Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
Panel B: Routine jobs
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Routine occupations (2001) 0.731 0.294 -0.255 0.213 0.050
(0.078) (0.062) (0.051) (0.083) (0.043)
Mean of DV .224 .369 .282 .191 .116
Local election districts 346 346 346 346 346
Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
Panel C: Retail
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Retail (2001) 0.779 0.268 -0.322 0.067 0.079
(0.116) (0.095) (0.064) (0.131) (0.061)
Mean of DV .224 .369 .282 .191 .116
Local election districts 346 346 346 346 346
Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
Panel D: Manufacturing
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Manufacturing (2001) 0.295 0.019 -0.020 0.067 0.019
(0.044) (0.046) (0.029) (0.055) (0.035)
Mean of DV .224 .369 .282 .191 .116
Local election districts 346 346 346 346 346
Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for two
way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table C3: Where do UKIP voters post 2010 come from? Studying Westminster Parliamentary elections
Other parties
UKIP Turnout Con Lab LD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No qualifications
Post 2010 x Pop. share with no qualifications 44.816 -5.424 -28.815 -8.743 15.998
(3.006) (2.129) (2.974) (4.069) (3.295)
Mean of DV 6.03 62.9 35.9 35.8 18.1
Harmonized constituencies 566 573 573 573 573
Observations 2047 2285 2283 2283 2283
Panel B: Routine jobs
Post 2010 x Working age pop. share working in routine occupations 96.878 -29.340 -27.619 -58.484 26.620
(5.396) (3.607) (6.600) (7.960) (6.591)
Mean of DV 6.03 62.9 35.9 35.8 18.1
Harmonized constituencies 566 573 573 573 573
Observations 2047 2285 2283 2283 2283
Panel C: Retail
Post 2010 x Working age pop. share working in Retail 105.018 -35.603 -15.902 -81.719 23.520
(10.381) (4.952) (8.871) (11.848) (9.592)
Mean of DV 6.03 62.9 35.9 35.8 18.1
Harmonized constituencies 566 573 573 573 573
Observations 2047 2285 2283 2283 2283
Panel D: Manufacturing
Post 2010 x Working age pop. share working in Manufacturing 42.112 -20.545 -1.271 -36.274 15.915
(3.323) (2.020) (3.965) (4.718) (3.723)
Mean of DV 6.03 62.9 35.9 35.8 18.1
Harmonized constituencies 566 573 573 573 573
Observations 2047 2285 2283 2283 2283
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for
two way clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
49
Table C4: Where do UKIP voters post 2010 come from? Studying local elections prior to 2013
Other parties
UKIP Turnout Con Lab LD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No qualifications
Post 2010 x Pop. share with No qualifications (2001) 9.630 -6.431 -21.595 23.928 -6.244
(3.802) (4.616) (6.029) (7.328) (6.646)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 2612 2612 2612 2612 2612
Panel B: Routine jobs
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Routine occupations (2001) 9.723 -15.657 -30.527 35.622 9.399
(7.610) (8.801) (12.041) (13.635) (13.934)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 2612 2612 2612 2612 2612
Panel C: Retail
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Retail (2001) 30.152 -10.296 -17.581 11.671 17.527
(10.990) (8.616) (12.753) (20.722) (16.993)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 2612 2612 2612 2612 2612
Panel D: Manufacturing
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Manufacturing (2001) 2.378 -4.348 0.212 17.115 12.985
(3.454) (5.329) (7.044) (8.480) (9.530)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 2612 2612 2612 2612 2612
Notes: All regressions control for local authority district and NUTS1 region by time fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted clustering at the local
authority district level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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